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Strategy or disaster
Flood prevention related issues and actions in the Tisza River basin
Ferenc Schweitzer1
Abstract
Changes in land use of the lowland landscape along the Tisza River have largely been 
shaped by processes that took place aft er fl ood control and regulation measures of that river. 
As a result fl uvial accumulation has either been eliminated or restricted to the fl ood plain. 
At present human sett lements extend to some segments of the low fl ood plain threatened 
by fl ood hazard. The amended Vásárhelyi Scheme focuses on raising embankments and 
extension of fl ood plain. Floods called the att ention to problems that have to be solved, 
such as the stability of levee slopes. To prevent slope slumps it would be reasonable to 
start studies on fl ood control embankments in order to reveal sections endangered by an 
extreme water pressure during fl oods.
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Rising from the Northeastern Carpathians, Tisza River fl ows into the Danube 
aft er covering 946 km. The catchment of the Tisza (157,186 km2) opens up to-
ward the W and SW. Within its 700 km long section across the Alföld (Great 
Hungarian Plain), the water level remains below 100 m a.s.l. Along the middle 
and lower reaches in the plain its valley is asymmetric: geomorphologically it 
fl ows in a trough-shaped depression upon its low fl ood plain.
Tisza River emerged in the Late Pleistocene and initially it crossed the 
plain with its tributary Szamos (Someş) eastward from its present-day channel. 
Its terraces of Pleistocene age are to be found in the latt er regions. The river had 
been att racted to its present-day position by the Holocene depressions located east 
and north of Nyírség, the recent depression of Jászság and by the Szolnok–Titel 
trench. Its meandering channel changed frequently until the completion of water 
regulation, which were performed according to the concept of Pál Vásárhelyi. 
The fl atland is rich in microrelief forms as evidenced by the presence of cut-oﬀ  
meanders, double and triple channels (Fig. 1). Masses of water provided by fl oods 
stepping out on the left  bank between Tiszadob and Tiszafüred, fl owing across 
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4Fig 1. Relief types in the southeastern part of the Alföld. – 1 = low flood plain; 
2 = low flood plain of poor drainage; 3 = flood-free lowland (high flood plain); 
      4 = low alluvial fan covered with infusion loess; 5 = slightly rolling sandy lowland
5swamps and transported by the Hortobágy stream reached the Berett yó marsh 
situated 30–35 km away. The shallow (30–40 cm deep) water and the swamps once 
formed part of the extensive wetland within the Tisza drainage basin. Hortobágy 
stream fl ows north to south in a ca 10–12 km wide clayey channel, fi lled up with 
8–10 m thick fl uvial–alluvial sediments down to its tributary to Körösök. This 
minor valley used to be the track of the great fl oods; by now the area lying deepest 
within the Nagykunság and Hortobágy regions has been silted up. 
Nowadays huge masses of water originating from heavy rainfalls in 
the mountain frame and surging up in the plain create emergency situation 
during high stages. They cause fl oods of long duration and make large areas 
waterlogged in the Tisza valley.
The sett lements along the rivers of the Alföld were located in the so-
called high fl ood plain, which had not been inundated even during the most 
devastating fl oods. The ancient Tisza and its tributaries had fl ooded huge areas 
in the plain, a considerable part of which was occupied by marshy areas and 
backswamps (Fig. 2).
The idea of the regulation of the Tisza River had been raised for the fi rst 
time during the reign of King Matt hias Corvinus, in the second half of the 15th 
century. It was he who issued the fi rst decree that levees must be erected in order 
to protect the land. The basis of water regulation was created much later: the 
Habsburg Emperor Francis II emanated a law in 1807 encouraging the organisa-
tion of associations aimed at fl ood control and water regulation.
As a result of mapping of the Tisza between 1834–48 led by Sámuel 
Lányi it had become obvious that high water endangered 854 sett lements in 
18 counties, among them even some of those, which were located on the high 
fl ood plain and hitherto had not been inundated. It was a token of the low 
fl ood plain being silted up.
As a consequence of forest clearance, rough grazing and land cultiva-
tion along the river and probably enhanced by mining and quarrying activities 
within the drainage basin, runoﬀ  had increased and together with the risen 
high water levels they posed a serious threat for human sett lements. To protect 
the towns and villages, linear infrastructure and agricultural land the Tisza 
Valley Association was organised in 1846 under the guidance of Pál Vásárhelyi. 
It also pursued planning, co-ordination and implementation of activities on 
fl ood control and water regulation.
Construction of a system of embankments along the Danube and Tisza 
rivers and tributaries also involved the construction of artifi cial channels, cutt ing 
oﬀ  meanders and reclamation of swampy areas through the operation of drain-
age canals. These measures have been and still are considered one of the most 
radical contemporary interventions in the natural conditions of Europe. These 
measures were taken for the solution of tasks set by the socio-economic demands 
of the time.
6As it is well known, initiation of water regulation along the Tisza was 
the merit of Count István Széchenyi and implemented partly according to the 
plans elaborated by Vásárhelyi. These activities were based on the hydrologi-
cal law of Vásárhelyi, the validity of which for the middle stretches of great 
rivers had been recognised internationally. For instance, fl ood control and 
water regulation of the Middle Rhine and Mississippi valleys were executed 
on its basis.
What was the main point of this law? Vásárhelyi's att ention was drawn 
by the facts that during mean water the Tisza is in equilibrium and does not 
Fig. 2. Waterlogged areas in the Tisza valley prior to water regulation (Ihrig, D. 1952). – 
  1 = outlet of water from the river channel and direction of currents; 2 = inundated areas
7build sandbars. He had come to the conclusion that eﬀ ective measures on 
regulation are only feasible if:
a) the river is shortened by cutt ing through the braided channels (me-
anders),
b) fl oods provide a rapid drainage (travel time) similar to that of mean 
water which means that between channel width and depth of fl oods there 
should be an identical ratio as between those of mean water.
Taking into account the above considerations, Vásárhelyi calculated 
the average distance between the embankments, and found it to be 750 m 
(changing between 500 and 1900 m depending on local factors). This caused 
serious commotion among the concerned public because close embankments 
could involve higher levels of fl oods with a growing hazard of the failure of 
dikes. This uncertainty and panic mood had been the reason why the Italian 
engineer Pietro Paleocapa had been invited as an expert. It was he who pro-
posed the system of fl ood protection applied for the Po River i.e. shaping of a 
wide fl ood bed to be inundated by the great fl oods and of inner dikes along 
the river to hold back the lower summer fl oods.
However this system has a defect of its own: due to silting up of the 
fl ood bed by high waters year aft er year, the levels of fl oods rise as well. 
Nowadays the Po fi lled up its fl ood bed to an extent that low water of the river 
fl ows higher than the roofs of the houses in Ferrara.
From this short historical review it becomes clear that the optimum ex-
tension of the fl ood bed between dikes and levees has been a controversial issue 
since the time of Vásárhelyi and Paleocapa. So was the number of meanders to 
be cut through. Vásárhelyi planned 102 meanders to cut oﬀ , whereas Paleocapa 
found it necessary to shorten the channel by 15 meanders. Thus the river had 
been shortened (from 1420 to 977 km) whereas the stream gradient increased 
and the character of beds of low and medium discharge slightly shift ed toward 
the upper reaches. Rivers leaving mountain and hill regions suddenly acquire 
lower section character owing to an abrupt fall in stream gradient. In natural 
conditions sediment load of watercourses accumulates in alluvial fans (in a 
way the Nyírség or the Maros fan emerged) but it has recently been enforced 
to deposit in relatively narrow fl ood beds between the levees.
The Tisza and tributaries have always been rich in sediment load. Even 
the most ancient sett lements situated on high fl ood plains were inundated some-
times because the low fl ood plain in their surroundings had been silted up.
Natural sediment transport probably has grown with the progressing 
urbanisation and during 150 years of fl ood control the process of silting up and 
relief evolution of fl ood beds with the emergence of point bars accelerated. 
The updating of maps along the Tisza started in 1974 but later it was 
postponed. Preparation works called att ention to the process of silting up 
(Sass, J. 1981). Nevertheless, fi lling up of the fl ood bed and formation of point 
8bars had been neglected up to the turn of the millennium. It might sound 
absurd, because Vásárhelyi’s concept was a controversial issue, just on the 
basis of this problem. Though some experts did take into account the rise of 
high water stages on the fl ood plain pressed by the embankments, the rate of 
sedimentation was underestimated. Nowadays this has led to a situation when 
the embankments need to be raised regularly and if the present conditions are 
going to survive, this problem is here to stay (Fig. 3). 
According to the measurements and joint mapping activities of the 
Geographical Research Institute HAS and KÖTIVIZIG, the fl ood bed of the 
Tisza river at Szolnok has been silted up in a thickness of 200–240 cm since 
the water regulation measures. During the same period the fl ood plain of the 
Körösök has raised by 160–180 cm. The 5, 10 and 13 cm thick sediment layers 
accumulated by the fl oods of the past years or decades are clearly discernible 
(Figs 4 and 5). Based on VITUKI (1983) data each fl ood of the Tisza between 
1976 and 1983 left  an average 30 cm thickness of deposits, in spite of the miti-
gating eﬀ ect of the Kisköre water reservoir. During the great fl ood of spring 
2000, 14 cm thick sediment was deposited upward Szolnok.
This process will lead to the situation when fl ood waves occur higher 
than the level of the low fl ood plain prior to fl ood control measures, which 
used to be inundated regularly. E.g. now the Tisza does not fl ow along the 
deepest line of the valley but upon a silted up fl ood bed so once it steps out to 
the fl ood plain, the return of its water to its elevated channel is made impos-
sible. It seems the same is happening to the Tisza and its larger tributaries as 
it has occurred to the Huang He in China or to Po River and its environs in 
Italy (Fig. 6).
Fig. 3. Rising of the embankment along Tisza (Schweitzer, F. 2000)
9Fig. 6. Bloc-diagram showing silting up of the channel of Huang He, China (aft er Cholnoky, 
J. 1900). The initial height of the embankment was 14 m and the fl ood bed was fi lled up to 
11.5 m. The distance between the dikes was ca 11 km (Schweitzer, F.–Nagy, I.–Alföldi, L.)
Fig. 4. Profi le of the fl ood bed sediment sequence along 
the Körös River in Takácszug. – 1 = grey micaceous sand; 
2 = grey silty sand; 3 = dark brown clay; 4 = stratifi ed 
silty clay; 5 = grey silty fi ne sand; 6 = grey fi ne sandy silt; 
7 = greyish-brown hydromorphous soil; 8 = hydro-
morphous soil formed prior to fl ood control measures; 
                9 = infusion loess (Schweitzer, F. 1999)
Fig. 5. 137C distribution in the sediments of (fl oodway) 
point bar (I.) and Marótzugi-Holt-Tisza (abandoned me-
ander, II.), aft er Braun, M.–Dezső, Z.–Hadady, Gy. 2001. 
– A = depth; B = 137Cs activity concentration; 10x = tenfold 
                                         magnifi cation
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An extreme rate of silting up of fl ood beds is described in the book writ-
ten by Jenő Cholnoky entitled 'The land of dragons' (1900, p. 293) in relation with 
the Huang-he at Kaifeng. He writes: "I approached the big river from the large 
sett lements stretching at the mountain foothills and reached it on 13th January. 
The height of the embankments is14 m but the river fi lled up the channel so that 
they are only 2.5 m higher above the fl ood bed. Terrible situation! No wonder 
that the failures of the dikes along the Huang He are so devastating!" (
It is widely acknowledged that in 1999 and 2000 dike failures could be 
prevented along several sections of the Tisza and its tributaries in the Great 
Plain only with the involvement of enormous material expenditures and hu-
man eﬀ ort. However, in 2001 in the Bereg environs a dike failure occurred at 
Tarpa (Fig. 7). On the map compiled by Ihrig, D. (1952, Fig. 2) the most critical 
places and the extent of the waterlogged area can be seen.
Fig. 7. Geomorphological sketch of the environs of Tarpa (comp. by Balogh, J. 2001). – 
1 = rim of the high fl ood plain; 2 = high fl ood plain; 4 = fi lled up former meander; 5 = cut-oﬀ  me-
ander, waterlogged; 6 = slope, undistinguished; 7 = higher summit level between 160–180 m; 
                                            8 = lower summit level between 140–150 m
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Fig. 8. Geomorphological sketch of the section between Tiszakécske and Csongrád. – 
                1 = low fl ood plain; 2 = high fl ood plain; 3 = sett lement; 4 = embankment
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No chance must be given to what occurred repeatedly in the 20th century 
(1919, 1925, 1940, 1948, 1970, 1974, 1998, 1999, 2000) that the high water reached 
or overgrew the crest of dikes and levees. The latt er were constructed for a prob-
ability of the occurrence of the highest fl oods once in 50 years. Owing to the 
silting up of the fl ood bed they are either to be raised time and again (which has 
been the practice so far) or it must be completed by another solution. 
The opening of the fl ood bed in places where the emergency storage is 
allowed by geomorphologic, economic and social geographical conditions and 
by the infrastructure would contribute to the revival of quasi-natural conditions 
(Schweitzer, F. 2001, fi gs 8 and 9). The construction of detention reservoirs is 
considered part of the amended Vásárhelyi Scheme (Váradi, I.–Nagy, I. 2002, 
Fig. 10). Also this could provide solution for a nation-wide strategic problem 
because emergency situations threaten the security of life and property of 
nearly 1.5 million people. To counterbalance a permanent rise of fl ood levels 
dikes and levees must be enforced and raised periodically. As it was the case 
during the high water stages of the Tisza in 1999 and 2000, a system of more 
than one hundred years' age is slowly improved at the price of incredible hu-
man eﬀ ort and material means. The question however is if the whole system is 
able to meet the security requirements during the forthcoming centuries.
Large hydrological schemes must be supported with huge investments 
and they are to serve for long duration; their substitution is highly expensive 
and time consuming. Along the Körösök a very narrow (50–70 m wide) fl ood 
bed was left  during water regulation in the late 1800's (Alföldi, L. 1999). It con-
tinues into the 150–200 m wide fl ood bed on the Transylvanian part of the valley. 
This funnel-shaped confi guration has resulted in a bott leneck and led to fre-
quent dike failures, threatening with piping and extension of waterlogged areas 
during each fl ood. To prevent this hazard either fl ood beds should be broadened 
along the Hungarian section or the dikes must be relocated (Fig. 8).
←
Fig. 9. Geomorphological map of the outlet of Körösök to the Tisza (comp. by Balogh, J. 2001). 
– 1 = low fl ood plain; 2 = high fl ood plain; 3 = cut-oﬀ  meander, intermitt ently waterlogged; 
4 = cut-oﬀ  meander, permanently waterlogged, with reed-sedge vegetation; 5 = cut-oﬀ  
meander, intermitt ently waterlogged, with reed-sedge vegetation; 6 = fi lled up former me-
ander, intermitt ently waterlogged; 7 = fi lled up former meander in fl ood-plain gallery forest; 
8 = fi lled up former meander in fl ood-plain gallery forest, intermitt ently waterlogged; 
9 = fi lled up former meander cultivated as cropland; 10 = = fi lled up former meander, 
drained; 11 = alkaline, waterlogged fl at; 12 = wind blown sand; 13 = sand dune. Man-made 
landforms: 14 = row of pits on the fl ood bed (for dike construction); 15 = row of pits for 
dike construction with gallery forest coverage; 16 = kurgan; 17 = fl ood levee; 18 = highway; 
19 = railway; 20 = sett lement; 21 = boundary of natural microregion; 1.7.23 = Tiszazug; 1.8.12 = 
                         South Tisza Valley; 1.12.22 = Csongrád plain; 1.13.23 = Körösszög
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Fig. 10. Detention reservoirs in the Tisza Valley according to the amended Vásárhelyi 
                                                Scheme (Váradi, I.–Nagy, I. 2002)
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Further development of the Vásárhelyi Scheme (2002) is aimed at the 
lowland storage of water transported by fl oods (Fig. 10) Another opportunity 
is the enlargement of fl ood beds up to the geomorphological levels of the high 
fl ood plains (fi gs 8 and 9). This solution would contribute to the safe fl ood con-
trol and improve the biological habitability of the landscape if on the protected 
side (low fl ood plain) reservoirs of integrated use (accommodating abandoned 
channels) were constructed. These storage facilities as organic part of the natu-
ral environment (e.g. Bodrogzug, Köröszug, Tiszanána, Cserőköz) would play 
the ecological role of the swamps of past centuries. The realisation of similar 
schemes is the responsibility of academic research. The temporal perspective 
of these investigations is some hundred years. 150 years ago Pál Vásárhelyi 
outlined a nearly perfect scheme meeting the contemporary demands, yet leav-
ing behind quite a number of problems to be solved in the near future. In the 
fi rst step a number of questions must be answered by scientifi c research which 
have been outlined by the author in an earlier study (Schweitzer, F. 2000):
Studies on the evolution of the Tisza valley over the past ca ten thou-
sand years with mapping of buried and current channels and their intersec-
tions, since the latt er pose a piping water hazard;
Exploration and measurements of the rate of silting up of the fl ood 
bed, a survey of changes having taken place since fl ood control and water 
regulation measures; measurements on pollutants transported from the catch-
ment area to the fl ood bed and accumulated there; clearing out if sediment 
accumulation is uniform over the diﬀ erent parts of the fl ood bed and if there 
is a proven relationship between the distance from the dike and the rate of 
sedimentation;
Mechanism of the evolution of point bars and natural levees and their 
relationship with the silting-up process over the fl ood bed;
Investigations into historical changes of forest coverage of the moun-
tainous sections of the drainage basin of the Tisza and its tributaries;
Mapping and evaluation of the confi guration of high fl ood plain (high 
bank) and levees; study on the opportunities to extend fl ood bed, in some 
places elimination of embankments, function of which could be taken over 
by high banks in the future; or (as an alternative) construction of levees in 
more distant areas, investigations into the storage capacity of the extended 
fl ood bed;
Geoecological-geomorphological investigations over the fl ood plain 
and fl ood bed aimed at the rapid conduit of fl oods and at an adequate storage 
of excess waters;
Adequate treatment of the vegetation spreading over the fl ood bed. 
The gradient of the channel along the middle reaches of Tisza is 3 cm per one 
km and the current of water is slowed down by the emerging thick shrub;
Economic and social geographical studies.
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
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In the Tisza Valley the length of embankments of primary and sec-
ondary categories is 1320 km, to this 119 km high bank section is added mak-
ing up 1439 km as the total length of fl ood levees. In the course of the river 
regulation measures the length of the Tisza was reduced from 1420 km to 
977 km. At present the 600 km long Hungarian section of the river is fl anked by 
1085 km long embankment.
If raising of crests of dikes is to enjoy priority, it will have to be ex-
ecuted in the future more frequently than previously, owing to the intense 
silting up of the fl ood bed.
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The global problem of land degradation and desertifi cation
Ádám Kertész1
Abstract
It’s a well known fact that land(scape) degradation is an ensemble of negative processes 
extending over immense areas. The methodologies of physical and social geography are the 
best tools for the investigation of land degradation processes, due to the complex nature of 
these processes. It is well known that environmental factors contribute to land degradation 
processes. Socio-economic factors and the role of human society is equally important, and 
in some cases, even more important, than natural factors. Degradation processes within 
subhumid, semi-arid and arid areas are defi ned as desertifi cation processes to draw att en-
tion to the specifi c dangerous situation in these areas. Hungary signed the Convention on 
Desertifi cation, as increasing aridity is a real national danger, especially on the Danube-
Tisza interfl uve. There are areas in Hungary corresponding to desertifi cation defi nitions. 
Thus, desertifi cation research is an important challenge for Hungarian geography.
Key words: water erosion, land degradation, desertifi caton, Danube–Tisza interfl uve 
Introduction
The degradation of the Earth’s surface (i.e. land degradation) is one of the 
most severe problems of our times. The concept of land degradation originates 
from soil degradation and it is oft en used as a synonym for soil degradation. 
It is evident that if soil is degraded it has huge impacts on both the land and 
landscape, because soil degradation prevents or impedes plant growth. Land 
and soil are not identical notions, but they are oft en used interchangeably. 
To avoid this confusion, I propose to use the term ‘landscape degradation.’ 
Landscape degradation means much more than just the degradation of the 
uppermost layer of the Earth’s crust. It means the decline of all landscape 
forming factors and of their synthesis, which is called landscape in physical 
geography and landscape ecology. Landscape ecology and physical geogra-
phy deal with various aspects of landscape development (Tóth, A.–Szalai, 
Z. 2007). However, despite its importance, few scientifi c papers in Hungary 
report degradation processes.
¹ Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. H-1112 Budapest, 
Budaörsi út 45. E-mail: kertesza@helka.iif.hu 
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Soil degradation processes
Soil degradation processes are grouped in diﬀ erent ways by various authors. 
A more practical classifi cation is presented below (EEA Environmental As-
sessment Report 2003). 
(1) Soil sealing. It is not by accident that soil sealing is given fi rst place 
amongst soil degradation processes. Soil sealing is the result of construction 
activities (including roads, railways and buildings). Due to soil sealing, the 
soil does not function properly, as it has no contact with the atmosphere and is 
devoid of vegetation. On the sealed soil surface, water runs oﬀ  without being 
fi ltered, with increased velocity and volume. The highest share of sealed soil 
surface (16–20%) is in Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark. The share of 
sealed soil has been continuously growing within the EU. reaching an average 
value of 8–9% in 2000. 
(2) Soil erosion (Photo 1). In Europe water erosion is more important 
than wind erosion, but wind erosion also causes huge damage. As an example 
of the importance of wind erosion in the World we should remember that the 
establishment of the US Soil Conservation Service took place primarily because 
of the sand storms of the 1930s. Soil erosion risk and the damage caused by 
erosion are also very remarkable in Hungary (Jakab, G.–Szalai, Z. 2005).
Photo 1. Gully erosion near Bergville, South Africa
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(3) Soil contamination can originate from both diﬀ use and local sourc-
es. Contamination from the atmosphere, from running water or from the soil 
belong to the fi rst group. These processes may cause acidifi cation, eutrophica-
tion and other severe damage. The direct application of chemicals (fertilizers, 
pesticides and sewage sludge), sometimes also containing heavy metals, are 
also diﬀ use sources. Local contamination sources can be of diverse origins and 
are usually connected with industrial activity.
(4) Salinization. Near-surface salt accumulation is present in several 
European countries, including Hungary. The most important areas aﬀ ected 
by seashore, inland and secondary salinization due to irrigation are in the 
Mediterranean countries, Hungary and several countries of the former Soviet 
Union (Photo 2). 
(5) Soil compaction is the result of the activity of soil cultivating ma-
chines. Subsoil compaction is an extremely damaging and is diﬃ  cult to rectify. 
The fi rst World assessment of soil degradation is GLASOD (Global 
Assessment of Soil Degradation, Oldeman, L.R. et al. 1991), which assesses 
the following degradation processes:
The extension of various forms of soil degradation
water erosion
–
▪
Photo 2. Saline spot on the Danube-Tisza Interfl uve, near Apajpuszta
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wind erosion 
chemical degradation
physical degradation.
The rate of degradation
Light
Moderate
Strong
Extreme. 
The causes of degradation (deforestation, overgrazing, improper farm-
ing, overexploitation, contamination).
According to Oldeman, L.R. et al. (1991) 3.7% of the Earth’s surface is 
aﬀ ected by physical and chemical degradation and 12% by water and wind 
erosion (Tables 1 and 2). Especially high is the proportion of physical and 
chemical degradation in Europe and in Central America and the share of the 
areas aﬀ ected by soil erosion is also the highest here. Studying these tables, it 
is evident that soil degradation is a major problem in Europe.
The concept of land degradation
As mentioned above, land degradation means much more than the degra-
dation of the land/soil. Because of the complex nature of land degradation 
processes it is essentially a geographical subject matt er. In this paper, land 
degradation will be discussed from the perspective of physical geography. 
However, land degradation can result from both physico-geographical and 
socio-economic causes. An evident example is overpopulation of humans and 
animals launching well-known degradation processes. The investigation of 
land degradation processes together with land use change studies represent 
the most up-to date and innovative research trends in modern geography.
According to Barrow, C.J. (1991) it is impossible to give a precise defi -
nition of land degradation. It may be defi ned “as the loss of utility or the re-
duction, loss or change of features or organisms which cannot be replaced” 
(Barrow, C.J. 1991). The land is degraded when “it suﬀ ers a loss of intrinsic 
qualities or a decline in its capabilities” (Blaikie, P.–Brookfield, H. 1987). The 
UNEP (1992) defi nition emphasized the reduction of the potential of natural 
resources as a result of processes acting in the landscape. Johnson, D.L.–Lewis, 
L.A. (1995) underlined the role of human interventions in land degradation 
and focused on the reduction of biological production and/or utility of an 
area. Distilling the essence of these cited defi nitions, it is evident that there 
are common elements in them. Hence, even thought it is diﬃ  cult to give a 
precise defi nition acceptable to all disciplines, the concept of land degrada-
tion is fairly clear. It means the reduction or loss of biological productivity 
▪
▪
▪
–
▪
▪
▪
▪
–
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and negative eﬀ ects on the functioning of the land and related ecosystems 
(Hudson, P.F.–Alcántara–Ayala, I. 2006). Functioning of the land involves 
the interaction of environmental factors and connections between landscape 
components, such as hillslopes and fl oodplains. These defi nitions and expla-
nations show very clearly that land degradation is much more complex than 
soil degradation.
Land degradation processes can have both natural and human (anthro-
pogenic) origins. It is obvious that since the appearance of human beings on the 
Earth the importance of anthropogenic processes is enormous and has grown 
exponentially with time. Among natural processes, climate change is extremely 
signifi cant, considering that the rapid rate of climate change today is largely a 
human-induced process. However, most authors who have tried to defi ne land 
degradation restrict it to human-induced processes. In this sense, landscape 
development always involves degradation processes of natural origin, but these 
processes will then be compensated by the regenerating capacity of the landscape 
(Bádonyi, K. 2001). This approach excludes the infl uence of natural processes, 
such as natural climate change, natural catastrophes or geologic soil erosion.
Global processes like global climate change, land use and land cover 
change, together with population increase, accelerate and increase land deg-
radation. Especially, Third World countries suﬀ er from degradation processes. 
In these countries overexploitation of natural resources in environmentally-
sensitive areas also contribute to the acceleration of degradation processes. 
The eﬀ ect of global warming on already degraded land also increases the 
intensity of degradation.
According to Menshing, H.G.–Seuffert, O. (2001) it is very important 
that no irreversible damage occurs in the landscape due to improper land use. 
This is actually the application of the principles of sustainable development 
(i.e. the regenerating capacity and potential of the landscape should remain 
under the circumstances of any kind of land use or landscape use). 
As mentioned before, soil and land degradation are oft en used in-
terchangeably (e.g. Imeson, A. C.–Emmer, I. 1992). Consequently, the salient 
processes of soil degradation and land degradation are identical (i.e. various 
processes of physical and chemical degradation belong to them). It is extremely 
important whether these processes are understood as landscape degradation 
or soil degradation processes.
Some 38% of the agricultural area of the Earth can be considered as 
degraded (Fig. 1). Most of the areas in question are in the Third World (the 
share of degraded territories in Africa is 65%, in Central America 74% and in 
South America 45%). The proportion of degraded pasture and forests is much 
smaller (21 and 18%, respectively). Considering only used land (agricultural 
area, permanent pasture and forests; Table 3) the proportion of degraded area 
is 23% and that of strongly degraded land is 14%.
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Table 3. Global estimates of soil degradation, by region and land use (sources: FAO 1990, 
Oldeman, L.R. et al. 1991 and Scherr, S.J. 1999)
Region
Agricultural land Permanent pasture Forests
Total Degraded
%
Total Degraded
%
Total Degraded
%(million 
hectares) (million hectares)
(million 
hectares)
Africa
Asia
South America
Central America
North America
Europe
Oceania
World
187
536
142
38
236
287
49
1475
121
206
64
28
63
72
8
562
65
38
45
74
26
25
16
38
793
978
478
94
274
156
439
3212
243
197
68
10
29
54
4
685
31
20
14
11
11
35
19
21
683
1273
896
66
621
353
156
4048
130
344
112
25
4
92
12
719
19
27
13
38
1
26
8
18
Region
All used land
Total agricultural land, 
pasture and forests Degraded %
Seriously de-
graded %
(million hectares) (million hectares)
Africa
Asia
South America
Central America
North America
Europe
Oceania
World
1663
2787
1516
198
1131
796
644
8735
494
747
244
63
96
218
104
1966
30
27
16
32
9
27
17
23
321
453
139
61
79
158
6
1216
19
16
9
31
7
20
1
14
Fig. 1. Estimates of soil degradation in the world, by region and land use (aft er FAO 1990, 
                                  Oldeman, L.R. et al. 1991 and Scherr, S.J. 1999).
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Desertifi cation processes
Desertifi cation processes represent a special group of land degradation proc-
esses. According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Convention to 
Combat Desertifi cation “Desertifi cation means land degradation in arid, semi-
arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors including climate 
variation and human activities” (UNCOD 1977). The term ‘desertifi cation’ has 
emotional connotations and therefore its use is preferred to the term “land 
degradation.” It must be emphasized, however, that desertifi cation has a dif-
ferent meaning than “desertation” (i.e. the formation of deserts).
The concept of desertifi cation is much older than UNCOD. It dates 
back to the 1920s (Bovill, D.W. 1921, cited by Herrmann, S.M.–Hutchinson, 
C.F. 2005) when the extension of the West African Sahara into the Sahel zone 
was fi rst observed. The term ‘desertifi cation’ was fi rst used by Aubreville, A. 
(1949) to describe the change of productive land into a desert (Herrmann, S.M.–
Hutchinson, C.F. 2005). According to this fi rst defi nition, the term desertifi cation 
is always connected with human activities (i.e. with land mismanagement). The 
Nairobi UNCOD Conference (United Nations Conference on Desertifi cation) in 
1977 came about following extremely arid periods in Sahelian Africa.
Climate change as a consequence of the greenhouse eﬀ ect is a major 
global process. As it is the main factor infl uencing desertifi cation processes, 
the global importance of desertifi cation will increase and it is and it will be the 
most important group of land degradation processes in those regions of the 
world where there the climate is arid, semi-arid or dry subhumid.
The atmospheric conditions of arid, semi-arid and subhumid climates 
are those that create large water defi cits, that is, where potential evapotranspi-
ration (ETP) is much greater than precipitation (P). These conditions are evalu-
ated by various indices. One of these is the FAO-UNESCO (1977) bioclimatic 
index: P/ETP. The threshold values of the bioclimatic zones are given below:
Arid zone:0.03 <P/ETP <0.20
Semi-arid zone: 0.20 <P/ETP <0.50
Subhumid zone: 0.50 <P/ETP <0.75
Whereas desertifi cation occurs under the climate conditions given in 
the defi nition, desertifi cation processes are also evident in other climate zones 
(e.g. associated with salinization). On the other hand, there are examples where 
drought did not lead to desertifi cation under arid climatic conditions, because 
of proper land management. Desertifi cation is the result of a combination of 
drought with land mismanagement (Le Houérou, H.N. 1996). Desertifi cation 
processes aﬀ ect 42 million km2 (33% of the Earth’s land surface, Eswaran, 
H.–Reich, P. 1998), eﬀ ecting some 1 billion people.
FAO/UNEP (1984) proposed a system of criteria for the evaluation of 
desertifi cation status (Table 4). The matrix contains data on plant cover, water 
–
–
–
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and wind erosion and salinization. Verón, S.R. et al. (2006) criticized the matrix 
from several perspectives, particularly the subjective nature of the data. 
Desertifi cation processes also aﬀ ect Hungary, therefore Hungary is a 
signatory of the Desertifi cation Convention. It is interesting that even Iceland 
belongs to the countries suﬀ ering from desertifi cation problems and research 
activities on the topic are remarkably advanced (Arnalds, O. 1997; Arnalds, 
O.–Kimble, J. 2001).
The original concept of desertifi cation from the 1920s and 1940s is 
slightly diﬀ erent from the UNCOD defi nition, which puts much more empha-
sis on the formation of deserts and considers desertifi cation as a process lead-
ing to desert development. According to Menshing, H.G.–Seuffert, O. (2001) 
we can describe a landscape desertifi ed only if geoecological characteristics 
of a landscape have already reached the representative values of the desert or 
these values will be reached within a certain period of time. Authors support-
ing this concept of desertifi cation concentrate fi rst of all on marginal and zones 
surrounding deserts, which are especially sensitive to desertifi cation, as in the 
Sahara–Sahel marginal belt. There is continuous debate on the defi nition and 
understanding of desertifi cation (Bádonyi, K. 2001). All concepts agree upon 
the fact that desertifi cation means severe degradation problems of territories 
with water defi cits and ongoing aridifi cation.
The main triggering factor of desertifi cation is usually the removal of 
natural vegetation by human society. This includes all forms of vegetation, not 
only forests, but also shrubs, weeds and grasses. Vegetation removal leads to 
climatic changes in the atmospheric boundary layer and increases aridifi ca-
tion. Consequently, surfaces indurate, sometimes accompanied by crusting, 
and infi ltration rates decrease.
Soil crusting and the lack of vegetation then exacerbates the destruc-
tive eﬀ ects of both water and wind erosion. Soil erosion removes the upper 
soil layers, which are usually rich in humus and nutrients, so reducing the 
feasibility of both vegetation re-establishment and agricultural land uses. Thus, 
landscape potential diminishes. The chance of reclaiming and regenerating 
vegetation in arid areas is less feasible if the climate is variable, especially if 
extreme events like extreme changes of moisture conditions are frequent (e.g. 
long periods of drought and catastrophic high intensity rainfall events).
Reclaiming degraded, or desertifi ed land is an important issue in com-
bating these processes (Mitchell, D.J. et al. 1998). Prevention, if at all possible, 
may even be more important than reclaiming already damaged land. Just one 
example of prevention against runoﬀ  and soil erosion is conservation agricul-
ture or minimum tillage (Bádonyi, K.–Madarász, B. 2004).
Desertifi cation is fi rst of all related to specifi c climatic conditions and 
vegetation destruction and consequent soil erosion. All physico-geographi-
cal (environmental) factors contribute to desertifi cation, at least as modifying 
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agents. Relief, physical and chemical soil properties and soil parent material 
play important roles in the speed, rate and extent of desertifi cation.
Desertifi cation rate depends also on initial soil moisture content and 
human interventions, and the latt er can be a positive interference. The course 
and consequences of the process are clear, from the initial status (i.e. subhu-
mid, semi-arid or arid conditions) proceeding sequentially through the stages 
(e.g. if the area in question had a subhumid climate, then undergoing trans-
formation to semi-arid and then arid conditions. As a consequence of ongoing 
aridifi cation the area may become hyperarid. In terms of vegetation, steppe 
will turn into savanna, followed by thorny savanna and then into semi-desert, 
reaching the ultimate stage of a desert.
Conclusions
Land (landscape) degradation is an ensemble of negative processes extend-
ing over immense areas. The methodologies of physical and social geography 
are the best tools for the investigation of land degradation processes, due to 
the complex nature of these processes. It is well known that environmental 
factors contribute to land degradation processes. Socio-economic factors and 
the role of human society is equally important, and in some cases, even more 
important, than natural factors.
Land degradation was fi rst appreciated by soil science as where the 
possibilities of agricultural use on degraded land are restricted or prevented 
because of soil degradation. Various forms of soil degradation are striking phe-
nomena themselves, with saline areas being a good example. If the degraded 
area is not used for agricultural production, then the degradation of natural 
vegetation can also be striking. Land(scape) degradation processes are also 
present in Hungary, oﬀ ering a major challenge to Hungarian geography.
Degradation processes within subhumid, semi-arid and arid areas are 
defi ned as desertifi cation processes to draw att ention to the specifi c danger-
ous situation in these areas. The poorest regions of the Earth belong to here, 
totalling 40% of the Earth’s surface. These regions are continuously struggling 
with famine. There is debate about the defi nition of desertifi cation. Should the 
threshold values of the P/ETP index be taken literally, in which case the term 
desertifi cation does not refer to desert formation? Or should the defi nition re-
late to the possibility of desert formation? Or it should it be restricted to those 
territories where the result of desertifi cation will or may really lead to desert 
conditions? Hungary signed the Convention on Desertifi cation, as increasing 
aridity is a real national danger, especially on the Danube-Tisza interfl uve. 
There are areas in Hungary corresponding to desertifi cation defi nitions. Thus, 
desertifi cation research is an important challenge for Hungarian geography.
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Because of the complexity of the processes, future desertifi cation re-
search should concentrate on revealing all environmental and landscape eco-
logical aspects of the problem, aimed at presenting a full ecological synthesis 
of the landscape. Based on this synthesis, precise and practical suggestions 
should be developed on how to arrest land degradation, or how to redirect 
it towards positive directions, that is towards landscape reclamation and re-
habilitation.
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Competitiveness of the Hungarian regions
György Enyedi1
Abstract
The present paper explores the competitiveness of the Hungarian counties (NUTS III) 
and regions (NUTS II) in two dimensions: in national scale and in European comparison. 
Competitiveness has been expressed by three interrelated economic parameters: a) per capita 
GDP; b) labor productivity; and c) employment rate. 
The paper concludes that regions in Hungary have reached three diﬀ erent stages 
of economic development. A) Budapest Metropolitan Region (BMR) is a foremost growth 
pole of the country. It is a real knowledge based and innovation generating economic re-
gion. B) North-western Hungary is in the stage of investment led development having a 
knowledge user economy without generating it locally. C) Northern and Eastern Hungary 
is in neo-Fordist stage of economic development, where economic restructuring just started; 
under-employment and rural crisis are widespread, with an exception of some larger cit-
ies. In EU accession countries, BMR is a most competitive region, second only to Prague 
Agglomeration, whereas Eastern and Northern regions of Hungary have a weak position 
economically. 
Keywords: competitiveness, regional inequalities, comparison of EU regions
Introduction
During the last few years both research and economic policy making have 
shown an eager interest for regional competitiveness. “Competitiveness“ has 
become the magic world for explaining or planning economic success for 
micro-economic (enterprise) and macro-economic (national) levels since long, 
although there have been hot debates about the content and measurement 
methods and one could not easily apply them while analyzing regional com-
petitiveness. Even the defi nition of “region“ is problematic; and, certainly, 
regional competitiveness is not a simple sum of competitiveness of fi rms, 
located in a given region, or a fraction of national competitiveness.
Growing interest in Europe for regional – and urban – competitiveness 
may be explained by the strength of the sub-national territorial units in the EU 
cohesion policy. Mitigation of regional inequalities has been one of the most 
¹ Professor Emeritus, Centre for Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pécs, 
Hungary. E-mail: enyedi@rkk.hu
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important goals of the policy of the Community from the very beginning. 
There is a general consensus, that regional leveling may be served best by the 
improvement of competitiveness of less developed regions. Nevertheless, a 
number of questions are still open. Even the notion of regional competitive-
ness has been denied by an important author (Krugman, P. 1994), whereas the 
goals and the conditions of the competitiveness and its measurement have had 
diﬀ erent (even divergent) explanations (Porter, M.E. 1998).
The problem is alive for Hungary, as well as for the other accession 
countries, aft er they entered into the European Union (EU). Although the 
country’s economy was relatively open even within state socialist system2, 
regions competed rather for state subsidies, than improved productivity or 
export capacity of their economy. This practice has changed only slowly dur-
ing the transition period. Presently, Hungarian regions entered fully into the 
market competition, at least within the EU, and their competitiveness has 
become crucial.
This paper has three parts. In the fi rst part an att empt is made to de-
fi ne the content and the measurement methods of regional competitiveness 
as it has been treated and used in our research. The second part describes the 
elements of competitiveness of the Hungarian regions. In the third part this 
competitiveness is summarized on country and EU levels, with an outlook for 
the future development.
Defi nition and measurement methods of regional competitiveness
During the last decades, competitiveness has become the panacea for back-
wardness, regional inequalities, for declining economic performances. Al-
though the repetition of fashionable terms may have exaggeration, there is 
no doubt that – as a consequence of globalization – all sort of economic units, 
from an individual fi rm to transnational integrations of countries, compete 
with each other for markets, capital goods, innovations, qualifi ed manpower 
etc. The ultimate goal may simply be economic growth, or rising profi ts or im-
provement of the general well-being of a given country, region, or city. Global 
competition has produced growing inequalities so far, since prerequisites for 
the success in this competition show strong geographical disparities. It has 
also produced a few spectacular catching-up successes e.g. in South Eastern 
and Eastern Asia. Consequently, in the spirit of neo-liberal economics, the ad-
vice for lagging countries, regions or marginal people voices: be competitive. 
² In 1968, a profound economic reform abolished the central planning directives 
and introduced a number of market elements into the economy. Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming size of state ownership in economy, the state interventions in price formation 
and investment had made this market an imitated one Kornai, J. 1992).
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Regional policies are intended to enhance regional competitiveness (e.g. by 
infrastructure development), whereas social policies are purposed to develop 
competitiveness of persons (e.g. by continuous education). 
There is no general consensus about what regional competitiveness 
means. The European Commission interprets the term the following way: 
[Competitiveness means] the ability to produce goods and services which 
meet the test of international markets, while at the same time maintaining 
high and sustainable levels of income or, more generally, the ability (of re-
gions) to generate, while being exposed to external competition, relatively 
high income and employment levels… (European Commission, 1999. p. 4). 
Lengyel, I. quotes the European Competitiveness Report (Lengyel, I. 2004 p. 
326): “Competitiveness… is understood to mean a sustained rise in standard of 
living a nation and as low level of involuntary unemployment as possible.“ It is 
conspicuous how social solidarity is deeply embedded in European mentality. 
When “competitiveness” did replace “leveling” in regional policy, it suggested 
that the welfare state is over. Still, the defi nition of competitiveness contains 
welfare elements. The nostalgia for egalitarianism is especially strong in post-
communist societies where sudden switch to the market economy made social 
security fragile (Horváth, G. 1999).
Some authors – Krugman, P. (1996) being their emblematic fi gure 
– refuse to adopt  competitiveness (originally applied for fi rms, on micro-
economic level) on national or regional scale. He argues that no analogy could 
be made between a nation (region) and a fi rm. Firstly: an unsuccessful fi rm 
will go out of business, what is never to happen with a country (or region). 
Secondly: success of a fi rm will oft en be at the expense of another one, whereas 
competition between countries might be mutually advantageous. 
Porter, M.E. who has been the most frequently cited in writings about 
competitive advantages, suggests that the best measure of competitiveness 
is productivity. “The competitiveness, then, is measured by productivity“ 
(Porter, M.E.–Ketels, C.H.M. 2003, p. 7 cited by Gardiner, B.–Martin, R.–
Tyler, P. 2004). As it is assumed by the author of the present study, this view re-
stricts competitiveness to the market of goods whereas there are fi rms (regions) 
competing for tourists, capital investments, for att racting foreign students to 
their universities, etc. It means that competitiveness cannot be measured by a 
single fi gure or factor; there are diﬀ erent goals to compete for.
Certainly, speaking about regional competitiveness is a sort of simpli-
fi cation. A region is not a competing unit – it is the fi rms located and institu-
tions operating in the regions that take part directly in competition. There are 
unsuccessful fi rms in a prosperous region, as well as poor schools in a rich 
city. The term “competitive region“ means that the region has a number of 
local factors favourable for successes of fi rms and institutions. There is a long 
list for such factors from developed infrastructure to skilled manpower, from 
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modern (at present knowledge-based) sectors to traditional and specifi c skills, 
from innovation capacity to fl exible specialization etc. Competitiveness is not 
just an economic term, but it is a socio-cultural concept as well.
Competitiveness has a meaning of comparison. A competitive region 
should oﬀ er comparative advantages for its fi rms or institutions (or for its 
inhabitants). In order to make comparison, elements of competition should 
be quantifi ed: competitiveness should be measured on regional level. It is not 
a simple task: one should select the directly measurable elements (many im-
portant social factors are not quantifi able, e.g. handicraft  traditions), and even 
these measurable elements should have comparable data for all the territorial 
units and all the years in investigation. Evidently, a more detailed data set was 
made available for measuring regional competitiveness within Hungary, and a 
basic one for making international comparison. First we shall focus on analy-
zing the process of regional diﬀ erentiation within the country; then we shall 
compare the competitiveness of Hungarian regions to the EU-15 regions.3 
The territorial unit of our analysis will be the county, the sub-national 
territorial unit of public administration (NUTS-III). Hungary has 19 counties + 
Budapest; they have a long traditions (like voivodeships in Poland) and their 
territory has remained unchanged during the socialist period – the only ex-
ception among former communist countries. Hungary has 7 NUTS-II regions, 
mostly for the purpose of EU regional statistics, more recently, as territorial 
units for the 2007–2013 development planning – but these regions have neither 
elected government units, nor fi nancial resources of their own. Presently, aft er 
many aborted programs of territorial reforms in public administration, these 
NUT-II regions are rather units for central budget redistribution, and their 
institutions (e.g. regional development agencies) are those delegated from the 
central government. The advantage of the use of counties instead of NUTS II 
regions is that their analysis provides a more detailed geographical picture 
of competitiveness.
Competitiveness will be expressed by three interrelated economic pa-
rameters of the region:
per capita GDP;
labour productivity;
employment rate.
These indices fi t in the EU defi nition for competitiveness, quoted 
above. This is a simplifi ed approach about competitiveness, but its elements 
have appropriate data and make the substantial comparison of diﬀ erent ter-
ritorial units possible. For a more sophisticated model of competitiveness (the 
Pyramide model) see Lengyel, I. 2004.
³ The use of EU-15 average in comparison is justifi ed by the fact that most of the data 
refer to 2001; and the catching up to the average of the EU-15 has been the target of the 
economic policy since 1990.
–
–
–
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Competitiveness of Hungarian counties I: Basic elements
Per capita GDP is a most suitable parameter to characterize economic output 
and growth, the performance of a given county. In Hungary, the GDP has been 
recorded on county level since 1996. The last data available at the time of our 
research were from 2001. Thus, these fi ve years were compared; incidentally, 
these fi ve years represent a distinct period in our post-communist economic 
history.4 The GDP was calculated on purchasing power parity (PPP).
All of the counties produced growth between 1996 and 2001. Growth 
was especially dynamic in a group of seven counties (including BMR). They 
produced a clear catching up with the EU (see Table 1, Fig. 1), their growth being 
much faster than the EU-15 average. Even slowest counties have produced the 
EU average (even though they were not able to improve disadvantageous posi-
tion). These seven counties form an explicit geographical cluster: six of them 
are located along the Budapest–Vienna and Budapest–Balaton axes. Budapest 
experienced the most spectacular growth: the capital city is the only interna-
tional metropolis of the country. The city has proven to be a strong att raction 
⁴ 1990–1993 was a period of rapid collapse of the state economy (with a 30% drop in GDP); 
1993–1995 were the years of overall privatization and a substantial economic restructuring, 
whereas in 1996 a spectacular growth started, having slowed down aft er 2001.
Fig. 1. Per capita GDP as percentage of EU–15 average (2001)
38
for transnational corporations, and it has had a leading role in R&D and high 
level business services since long. Per capita GDP made up 86% of the EU-15 
average in 1996 and it rose to 108% by 2001. The second most developed county 
produced but 63% of the EU-15 average. Consequently, Budapest and a few 
developed counties have played an outstanding role in economic growth of 
Hungary. The less developed counties showed a distinct geographical cluster-
ing, too: with two exceptions all they are located either in Northern Hungary (in 
a region what suﬀ ered most from the decline of the traditional heavy industry) 
or on the Alföld (Eastern Hungary), a traditional rural area. The East/West 
divide of the country survived and became more accentuated. The poorest 
counties reach but 30% of the EU-15 average in per capita GDP.
The six-year period of the rapid growth examined saw increasing re-
gional inequalities. Some developed counties grew faster, while backward 
Table 1. Per capita GDP by counties and NUTS II regions compared to the average of EU–15
County, region 1996 2001 Changes 2001/1996
City of Budapest
Pest
Central Hungary
Fejér
Komárom-Esztergom
Veszprém
Central Transdanubia
Győr-Moson-Sopron
Vas
Zala
Western Transdanubia
Baranya
Somogy
Tolna
Southern Transdanubia
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén
Heves
Nógrád
Northern Hungary
Hajdú-Bihar
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg
Northern Great Plain
Bács-Kiskun
Békés
Csongrád
Southern Great Plain
Hungary
86
34
68
48
42
38
43
52
51
44
49
36
35
42
37
33
34
27
32
36
35
28
33
35
36
43
38
47
108
44
84
54
49
44
49
63
53
45
55
40
36
44
40
34
40
30
35
39
37
30
35
36
35
43
38
53
+22
+10
+16
+6
+7
+6
+6
+11
+2
+1
+6
+4
+1
+2
+3
+1
+6
+3
+3
+3
+2
+2
+2
+1
-1
0
0
+6
Source: Lengyel I. (2003, 311 p.).
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areas kept falling behind. Budapest is out of comparison: the BMR represents 
another category than the rest of the country. As far as the counties are con-
cerned: the most developed one has a per capita GDP 2.8 times higher than the 
less developed one in 2001 (there was a 2.6-fold diﬀ erence in 1996). The gap 
is widening between the most developed and handicapped counties; moreo-
ver, due to EU membership a further growth of disparities is expected. Most 
probably, the developed counties will be able to benefi t from EU structural or 
cohesion fund resources more than less developed ones will. (Enyedi Gy. 2004). 
Also, less developed rural counties in East Hungary will suﬀ er strongly from 
market competition within EU, because of their poor economic performance. 
Rural policy aft er the systemic change has been full of improvizations, it has 
had more welfare character instead of economic rationality and has tried to 
satisfy the alternating interest of diﬀ erent pressure groups. „Regional level-
ling” has been a favourite slogan of diﬀ erent political parties in the period of 
political campaigns; but no government could diminish regional diﬀ erences 
in standard of living while the gap is widening in competitiveness.
Productivity, the economic output calculated for a working hour, or 
the GDP per active population represents another important element of com-
petitiveness. Active population means those persons between age of 15 and 
64 years who are employed, sole proprietors, cooperative members, entre-
preneurs or (in case of agriculture) helping family members. It is worthwhile 
to distinguish between the output (GDP) per total population and per active 
earners. High productivity is a fundamental element of competitiveness and 
a long-term growth. One could produce growth in the case of low productiv-
ity and a massive employment of cheap labour (this is the case in developing 
countries and this was the case at the time of hasty “socialist” industrialization 
during the 1950s and 1960s). This sort of development supposes low-standard 
technology and traditional economic structure – both an absolute handicap 
in present-day European competition. In Hungary, the productivity has im-
proved quite impressively, due to rapid economic restructuring and technol-
ogy transfer, and a drop in employment rate.
Not surprisingly, regional inequalities have a similar spatial patt ern 
than that of per capita GDP, but they are less polarized (Fig. 2). In 2001, the 
productivity value (i.e. GDP/ active population) in the eminent county was 1.7 
times higher than in the least eﬀ ective one (in 1996 there was a 1.5-fold diﬀ er-
ence). Over the period in concern productivity improved by 31% in Hungary, 
led by the most developed counties (BMR: 48%, Győr-Moson-Sopron County: 
46%) thus the gap was widening between the leading counties and the rest 
of the country. At the same time, in this ”rest of the country” some levelling 
trends could be detected: there were counties in Western Hungary where 
progress had slowed down, while some backward areas were able to improve 
their position in ranking. 
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Finally, employment rate is the third basic element of regional produc-
tivity. Central Statistical Oﬃ  ce has calculated the employment rate on the 
15–64 years age group. Employment rate in Hungary is one of the lowest in 
Europe. Unemployment rate is not particularly high – around 6%, which re-
mained stable during the past years – but there are many people in active age 
being outside of the labour market. Besides general tendencies – e.g. aging 
population, growing number of university students – it is the exceptional fast 
economic restructuring and privatization in post-socialist Hungary that may 
explain this situation. Employees of the collapsing state owned heavy indus-
try and mining were oﬀ ered early retirement, because they had no chance 
(over 40) to be retrained or to fi nd new employment. So many people escaped 
unemployment by disability retirement. Although middle aged males have 
had poor state of health, indeed, massive disability retirement used to be an 
– oﬃ  cially never declared – form of social aid. In the less developed counties, 
the share of disability pensioners of the active age (under 64) population is 
over 10%, whereas in Western Hungary is around 5%. 
Another explaining factor of under-employment is the way of land 
re-privatization in agriculture in the early 1990s. It was a rather complicated 
process with the fi nal outcome of an excessively fragmented patt ern of land 
ownership. A part of the old-new owners (most of them left  agriculture dur-
ing the decades of the state socialist system) simply let their land to rent by 
Fig. 2. Geographical diﬀ erences in productivity (GDP/active population), 2001. (Country 
                                                                    average = 100)
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larger farms and they subsist on the rent, without having any registered oc-
cupation. Finally, in certain sectors illegal and non-registered employment is 
also important, either in the widespread black economy in general, or in the 
most developed north-western region in particular, where there is an extensive 
commuting of workers from Slovakia.5
Employment rate has improved in every county between 1996 and 
2002, but in most of them it had been a slow process. Regional inequalities have 
been rather stable as less developed counties did not succeed to enlarge job 
opportunities. The impressive per capita GDP growth was due to the improved 
productivity – good news to the economists – but it was not accompanied by 
a tangible enlargement of employment – bad news for social policy. Despite 
the decline in the number of the total population, Hungarian labour economy 
has not yet recovered from the consequences of over-employment in the state 
socialist system and of the collapse of the state economic sector during the 
transitional crisis.
The geographical patt ern is as usual: the north-west of Hungary excels 
in high employment rates (56–57% of the active age group), whereas the north-
east represents  another extreme (40–42 %, Fig. 3).
⁵ Building industry is the largest employer of the „black” manpower: to a great extent they 
are immigrants – fi rst of all from Romania – without working permit. Commuters from 
Slovakia are legal, but they are not registered in Hungarian population statistics, thus 
they are not calculated in employment rate either.
Fig. 3. Employment rate (employed population in percentage of active age i.e. 16–64 – year 
                                                                  population) 2002
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Competitiveness of Hungarian counties II: Infl uencing Factors
Lengyel, I. (2003) in his excellent monography presents a detailed analysis 
about diﬀ erent factors that infl uence regional competitiveness. He explains 
that the fi ndings of the analysis of key factors – namely that the remarkably 
improving economic performance of Hungary is practically due to 4–5 coun-
ties out of the 206 – “have an ex-post character, they measure competitive-
ness, but they do not explain which are the factors to defi ne the level of and 
changes in competitiveness“ (Lengyel, I. 2003 p. 329). Also he analyzed fi ve 
other factors suitable to explain the regional diﬀ erences in competitiveness. 
Based on his analysis four infl uencing factors are to be discussed. They are as 
follows: (1) Capital investment att raction both from abroad and other regions. 
In Hungary, foreign capital investment has played a decisive role in economic 
restructuring. Two-thirds of these investments was directed to the BMR.7 These 
investments are present in the high-tech, R&D, banking and in high level 
business sectors etc. In north-west Hungary, manufacturing industry was the 
main target for foreign direct investment (FDI). In the less developed regions 
foreign capital was mostly invested in public utilities (electricity, gas, sewage 
supply). These sectors have no multiplying eﬀ ect on local economy, thus they 
do not stimulate economic growth. (2) Infrastructure and human resources. With 
regard to competitiveness infrastructure has a very broad meaning: acces-
sibility of motorways in physical sense and Internet availability in terms of 
information are perhaps the most important features. Bulk of FDI has fl owed 
to establishments located along the Budapest–Vienna motorway. The network 
of international motorways is focused on Budapest, they oﬀ er a fast connec-
tion to Northern Italy (via Croatia) and to the West Balkans, but they have not 
yet reached the Ukranian border. There is a low PC supply and inadequate 
Internet accessibility in the households of the contry, with Budapest being the 
only exception. Internet fees are too high for being aﬀ orded by an average 
household. The concentration of modern infrastructure is even higher in the 
BMR than that of economic activity. Concerning human resources, our interest 
is reduced on measurable elements, mostly on education and age structure. 
The quality of  human resources is very much infl uenced by “soft “ features 
like traditions, business culture, work ethics etc. which are essential factors in 
more detailed regional studies – but they are not quantifi able the same way 
as economic or demographic factors. As far as the level of education is con-
cerned, its geographical patt ern does not follow the well known north-west/
north-east dichotomy. The position of Budapest is absolutely privileged: one 
quarter of the population over 25 years has a degree of higher education: the 
⁶ 19 counties and the BMR.
⁷ In reality, this share is smaller, but no data available concerning outsourcing by TNCs 
located in Budapest (including geographical distribution of the outsourced activities).
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second highest value is its half (12.5%) in Csongrád County located in the less 
developed southern part of the Alföld. Budapest has a post-industrial, met-
ropolitan economic structure with a large labour market for highly qualifi ed 
persons. There are no important diﬀ erences in the level of education between 
the counties: economy of the most developed ones (in term of per capita GDP) 
is based on manufacturing industry with a relatively low demand on cadres 
with fi nished higher education; at the same time, less developed regions east 
of the Tisza river traditionally have good schools and universities. Because of 
the low geographical mobility human resources are under-utilized in Eastern 
Hungary – perhaps providing reserve for the future development.
The geography of aging has its own spatial patt ern, which does not 
follow the traditional west/east divide. The aging index (i.e. percentage popu-
lation over 64 or elder of that under 14) is far the highest in Budapest; at the 
same time the outer zone of the BMR has the second youngest population in 
the country (Fig. 4). It means that Budapest follows the demographic patt ern 
of the cities in developed countries: suburbs house young and middle aged 
families with children, whereas the city centre is sett led by young professionals 
without children and by elderly people. The presence of a large group of young, 
educated, partly multinational professionals is an important asset of the city’s 
booming economy. At the same time, most of the aged population live among 
fragile life conditions, because of the devaluation of the retirement pensions 
since the 1990s. During the communist era, aged persons had no opportunity 
Fig. 4. The aging index, 2002
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to save for their aft er-retirement life and now in many cases high age means 
poverty and marginality, a drop-out from the middle class. Aging is present 
in some less developed counties as well, but rather in the south and not in the 
east of the country. Less developed counties have a relatively sizable rural 
population, what is aged in most cases because of the earlier out-migration 
of young population. The north- east (comprising the most backward rural 
areas) shows a young age structure, because of the relatively high propor-
tion of Roma population. Romas traditionally have a higher fertility rate, than 
the Hungarian population, and their life expentancy is lower. (3) Research and 
development It is not surprising that this sector, the primary factor to promote 
innovations and competitiveness in a knowledge-based economy, is concen-
trated in Budapest. Two thirds of the employees of the R&D sector work in 
the capital city: the otherwise developed north-eastern counties have a rather 
low research potential. In 2002, almost 90% of the patents registered abroad 
were produced in Budapest research institutions and laboratories. Outside 
Budapest, there are few developed R&D “islands“ mostly related to the best 
universities (at Debrecen and Szeged). These R&D centres have but a limited 
impact upon the development of their regions: the universities have no full 
faculties of technologies, and Hungarian enterprises which operate in these 
less developed regions are not innovation oriented. One of the drawbacks of 
the Hungarian R&D sector is that the major part of its scarce fi nancing8 comes 
from the state budget. Hungarian enterprises have business policy for a short 
perspective: TNCs which dominate the economic scene have their research 
units abroad – with the exception of some favourable cases. In sum: BMR is the 
only sizable centre of R&D in the country. (4) Small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMS). There are only few Hungarian TNCs, e.g. MOL, the petroleum company, 
or OTP Bank. They have built up a Central European network, but most of the 
enterprises in Hungarian ownership belong to the category of small and me-
dium sized ones.9 Their fi nancial capital and export activities are concentrated 
at Budapest; otherwise the geographical distribution has a rather uniform pat-
tern. SMEs operate mostly in local markets, they do not contribute tangibly to 
the competitiveness of their region. Nevertheless, their role in employment is 
quite important: in the less developed counties they provide jobs for a com-
bined 60–70% of the workforce in the production and production services sec-
tors. Hungarian economy has a dual character: the rapid penetration of TNCs 
modernized the Hungarian economy rapidly. They produce over 70% of export, 
but their decision-making centres are evidently outside of Hungary, and their 
employment capacity is relatively low. At the same time the SME sector being 
dominated by Hungarian capital is less innovative, and its long-term prospects 
⁸ Expenditures for R&D amounted to a mere 1.3% of the GDP in 2002.
⁹ Because of the geographical proximity, Austrian and German SMEs also operate in 
Hungary.
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in the present structure are ambiguous, even though they have a considerable 
weight in employment, especially in the less developed regions. Although the 
relationship between these two sectors – due to the expanding outsourcing of 
TNCs – is strengthening, they are still but loosely linked. 
Summary
(1) Competitiveness within the European Union. There is a certain gap within the 
European Union between former members and accession countries. On country 
level, Portugal, the less competitive country in EU–15 is headed only by Cyprus; 
Malta and Slovenia are on the same level as Portugal. They are followed by the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. Closing the gap seems to be a diﬃ  cult and long 
term task, especially if taking into consideration that new member countries 
could reach just the fragment of fi nancial sources that were earlier available for 
the Mediterranean half-periphery. On NUTS 2 level, Budapest Metropolitan 
Area is on the top of the accession countries, together with Prague, Cyprus and 
Bratislava. All the other Hungarian NUTS 2 regions are among the average 
of the accession countries except North-west Hungary (8th among regions of 
the new member states). Even though there has always been a concern about 
regional inequalities within Hungary, these diﬀ erences are not striking in Eu-
ropean comparison. Competitiveness of the BMR is close to the EU average, 
North-west Hungary has a relatively favourable position among new member 
countries, but all the other Hungarian regions have a weak competitiveness.
(2) Competitiveness within Hungary. Geographical diﬀ erences in competi-
tiveness were analyzed earlier. Very probably they show more than higher or 
lower degrees of competitiveness. Actually, three diﬀ erent stages of development 
are present in Hungary (Enyedi Gy. 2000; Lengyel, I. 2003). A) BMR is a promi-
nent growth pole for the country. It is developing into a real knowledge-based 
and innovation generating economic region: there is an important R&D sector 
including research units of TNCs; a number of regional (Central European, in 
some case European) company headquarters are located here; high level busi-
ness services are widespread. B) North-western counties are in the stage of 
investment led development; their economy uses knowledge without generat-
ing it locally. There are a number of newly developed plants in manufacturing 
and high-tech industry, invested mostly by TNCs, but they are not yet fi rmly 
rooted into local economy. Further development – i.e. switch into the knowl-
edge producing phase depends on how outsourcing will be able to integrate 
new investments into regional economy, and how the weak R&D sector will be 
strengthened. Central and South-west Transdanubian counties have the same 
character, in an incipient, less developed form. A and B types are more or less 
integrated into the European urban/economic networks in various respects 
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(fi nancial, transport, production, social values etc). Budapest and its region had 
presented a higher stage of urban/economic development during the whole 
period of modern urbanization than the rest of the country. C) Northern and 
Eastern Hungary comprising 12 counties altogether form the “third“ Hungary 
located east of the Danube. They are in neo-Fordist stage of economic develop-
ment, when economic restructuring just started and there is a certain hope that 
newly att racted investments in manufacturing industry would be able to solve 
the problem of under-employment and the rural crisis. Evidently, this huge area 
– half of the country’s territory – is not homogeneous; larger university towns 
– Debrecen, Miskolc, Szeged – form a couple of islands of modernity. They have 
a limited spill-over eﬀ ect upon their regions: they rather produce knowledge 
that will be used in the more advanced regions (Fig. 5).
(3) Competitiveness of regions: future trends. Geographical diﬀ erences in 
economic competitiveness of Hungarian regions have been shaped for long 
and within the state boundaries of the country. In 1972, Research Institute of 
Central Planning Board calculated the per capita GDP by counties. The geo-
graphical distribution of the most and less developed counties – and the dif-
ference between them – practically was the same than 30 years later. (The only 
important diﬀ erence was due to the decline of the mining and heavy indus-
try in Northern Hungary.) Whenever a new economic or technological stage 
Fig. 5. Stages of regional development. – A = knowledge-based stage; B = investment led 
stage; A + B = integrated into global networks; C1 = signs of catching up; C2 = neo-Fordist 
                         stage, local economy; D = modern „islands”, transborderties
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of development started to spread from the European core area towards the 
semi-periphery, it was always Budapest urban region the fi rst and North-west 
Hungary the second of the regions to adapt innovation and to extend it to the 
rest of the country. Aft er 1989, international infl uence became much stronger, 
as a consequence of the dissolution of the state socialist system and that of the 
advancement of globalization: but the geographical picture has not changed. 
As it is assumed by the author, EU membership of Hungary may change this 
long lasting tendency for two reasons. a) Hungarian regions became a part 
of the united European market, thus they are forced to compete with all the 
European regions, without the slightest possibility for state protectionism. 
Hungary shall learn in the near future, how competitive advantages within the 
country may be converted onto European scale. Most probably, competitive-
ness of Budapest is not in danger what may further strengthen the advantage 
of the capital city region. b) In a longer run, transboundary cooperation may 
lead to the formation of international regions. This may aﬀ ect the whole re-
gional structure of the country substantially for out of the 19 counties 15 have 
state border. The relatively small country (93,000 km2 – the size of Portugal) has 
seven neighboring states. Five of them – Austria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Romania – are EU members, and Croatia will hopefully join the Union in 
the near future. There are potentially good opportunities for the formation of 
transnational regions (a closer integration, than the present day Euroregions) 
what may put less developed Northern and Eastern Hungarian counties into 
a more favourable position than they have today. Cities in Eastern Hungary 
could acquire gateway functions towards South Eastern Europe which may 
speed up their post-industrial development.
Hungarian economy was hit rather seriously by the present global 
economic crisis. Budget defi cit and foreign indebtedness allow but a limited 
opportunity for government fi nancial intervention to stimulate market de-
mands. The high share of TNCs in industrial and fi nancial sectors means that 
fundamental decisions on the level of enterprises are taken abroad. At the 
time of writing of this paper, nobody could tell how long this crisis is to last, 
how and when the recovery will begin. Maybe the content of competitiveness 
shall be modifi ed and neo-liberal economic policy revised. Most probably, the 
crisis will enhance regional inequalities as the recovery will start in the most 
advanced regions and we can expect a longer crisis in backward regions.
REFERENCES
Enyedi Gy. 2000. Globalizáció és a magyar területi fejlődés. (Globalization and the Hungarian 
regional development.) – Tér és Társadalom vol. 14. no. 1. pp. 1–10.
Enyedi Gy. 2004. Processes of Regional Development in Hungary. – In: The Region, Enyedi, 
G.–Tózsa, I. (eds). Akademiai Kiadó, Budapest, pp. 21–35.
48
European Commission 1999. Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic Situation 
of Regions in the EU. European Commission, Brussels.
Gardiner, B.–Martin, R.–Tyler, P. 2004. Competitiveness, Productivity and Economic 
Growth Across the European Regions. Regional Studies, vol. 38. pp. 1045–1067.
Horváth, G. 1999. Changing Hungarian Regional Policy and Accession to the European 
Union. European Urban and Regional Studies, vol. 6. no. 2. pp. 166–177.
Kornai, J. 1992. The Socialist System. – The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
Krugman, P. 1994. Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession. Foreign Aﬀ airs, vol. 73. 
pp. 28–44.
Krugman, P. 1996. Pop Internationalism. – MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Lengyel I. 2003. Verseny és területi fejlődés. (Competition and Regional Development.) 
– JATE Press, Szeged.
Lengyel, I. 2004. The Pyramid Model: Enhancing Regional Competitiveness in Hungary. 
Acta Oeconomica, vol. 54. pp. 323–342.
Porter, M.E. 1998. On Competition. Harvard Business School Press, Boston.
Porter, M.E.–Ketels, C.H.M. 2003. UK Competitiveness: Moving to the Next Stage. 
Economical Paper 3, Department of Trade and Industry, London.
49
Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 2009. Vol. 58. No 1. pp. 49–67.
Geopolitics of pipelines and Eastern Europe with especial 
regard to Hungary
Károly Kocsis1–Tibor Tiner2
Abstract
The energy strategy of East Central European countries have joined to EU in 2004 is dif-
ferentiated. It can be stated that majority of these countries have already energy policy 
and strategy to secure their own energy supply. All of them are making fl uent eﬀ orts to 
be independent from considerable part of the Russian oil and gas import in the near or 
farer future. To avoid negative eﬀ ects of the future’s unforeseen gas wars and unfriendly 
actions originated from Russia or Ukraine, the new member states of the European Union 
have worked out more scenarios and projects for the future. Additionally, they have also 
declared targets to increase the rate of renewable energy in their domestic energy produc-
tion. Opposite to it Hungary is still stuck into powerful energy economies that drive to 
international energy-security politics. The county has just switched sides when turned oﬀ  
from US initiations and gave preference to Russian connections. Furthermore there are no 
visible indication of a coherent national energy security strategy. It is not surprising that the 
country is not taken into account when decisions are made, neither to the extent is should. 
It shoud be priority to take pending political decisions and  form a real national strategy.
Key words: energy policy, gas pipelines, East Central Europe 
The global energy sector is under a continuous tension since the end of the 20th 
century, which is a result of the rapid growth of global energy consumption, 
of the skyrocketing of energy prices and the strong competition for the energy 
resources. So it is understandable, that the security of supply of energy, being 
the engine of economic development, is an extremely important issue, fi rst 
of all for the importing countries. This is especially true for the EU-member 
countries, which are only able to cover a minor part of their energy consump-
tion by own production (Table 1). The present-day tense situation results from 
the risks of great imbalances between energy demand and supply. Additional 
problems are the territorial concentration of the major hydrocarbon reserves 
and the political uncertainty in some of these energy producing regions 
¹ Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. H-1112 Budapest, 
Budaörsi út 45. E-mail: drkocsiskaroly@gmail.com
² Geographical Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. H-1112 Budapest, 
Budaörsi út 45. E-mail: tinertibor@t-online.hu
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(Fig. 1, 2). The Golf States and Russia possess the 62.9% of the proved oil and 
73.3% of the proved natural gas reserves of the world (Table 2). At the same 
time the majority of the energy import concentrates to Europe and North 
America (e.g. 59% of the crude oil import, 85.5% of the natural gas import in 
Table 1. World Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production and Consumption (2006)
Continents, regions
Crude Oil
Million tons
Natural Gas
Billion cubic metres
Production Consumption Production Consumption
North America
Central & South America
Europe
Former USSR
Middle East
Africa
Asia & Oceania
World Total
EU-27
454.9
533.6
251.9
607.3
1240.2
499.8
394.5
3984.2
119.8
1055.1
375.2
771.0
193.9
329.0
142.1
1186.8
4053.1
731.6
713
194.9
309
832.8
345.4
197.3
375
2967.4
213.3
724.7
185.6
551.8
681.8
324.9
86.9
432.2
2987.9
532.1
Source: www.eia.doe.gov
Table 2. World Proved Crude Oil and Natural Gas Reserves (January 1, 2009)
Continents, regions, 
countries
Crude Oil Natural Gas
Billion 
barrels Million tons
Trillion cubic 
feet
Billion cubic 
metres
North America
Central & South America
Europe
Former USSR
Middle East
Africa
Asia & Oceania
World Total
EU-27
Norway
Russian Federation
Kazakhstan
Azerbaĳ an
Turkmenistan
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
Algeria
209,910
122,687
13,657
98,886
745,998
117,064
34,006
1,342,207
6,321
6,680
60,000
30,000
7,000
0,600
136,150
115,000
104,000
15,210
266,710
97,800
12,200
28,754.8
16,806.4
1,870.8
13,546.0
102,191.5
16,036.2
4,658.4
183,864.0
865.9
915.1
8219.2
4,109.6
958.9
82.2
18,650.7
15,753.4
14,246.6
2,083.6
36,535.6
13,397.3
1,671.2
308,794
266,541
169,086
1993,800
2591,653
494,078
430,412
6254,364
84,296
81,680
1,680,000
85,000
30,000
94,000
991,600
111,940
63,360
891,945
258,470
214,400
159,000
42,300.5
36,512.5
23,162.5
273,123.3
355,021.0
67,681.9
58,960.5
856,762.2
11,547.4
11,189.0
230,137.0
11,643.8
4,109.6
12,876.7
135,835.6
15,334.2
8,679.5
122,184.2
35,406.8
29,369.9
21,780.8
Source: www.eia.doe.gov
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2005). The largest European oil and gas consumers (and importers) are in the 
west (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Benelux states) surrounded from 
afar by their largest suppliers (Russia, Norway, Algeria, Lybia, Golf states) 
(Fig. 3, 4). The territorial imbalance between the energy exporters and import-
ers upgraded the role of the transit countries, who during the last years, the 
time of the infl ating energy prices oft en came into confl icts, price-disputes with 
the producers (e.g. Russia’s disputes with Ukraine in 2006, 2009, with Belarus 
in 2007). These confl icts resulting temporary breakdown in the energy supply 
drew att ention the importance of the security of energy supply, the security of 
the energy markets and the need of the diversifi cation of supply routes. In this 
Eurasian geopolitical context of the energetic issue the East European countries 
play a special role as an important transit area between Russia, Middle East 
and Western Europe.
Fig. 1. Oil reserves in Europe (January 1, 2009, million tons)
52
Some geopolitical characteristics of the energy supply in Europe
During the last quarter century the production and consumption of crude 
oil and the production of natural gas nearly stabilized, in parallel with the 
sharp decline of the coal production and consumption. Due to the fact, that the 
natural gas is the cleanest, most nature-friendly energy source (similar to the 
nuclear energy) and its application entails any social problems, its share in the 
European energy balance is continuously increasing. Between 1980 and 2005 
the gas consumption of the EU-27 increased by 88.4% and for the period of 
2005–2030 a growth of 24% (from 537 bcm to 666 bcm) is forecasted. At the same 
time the EU’s gas production will decrease by 30% until 2030 (Esnault, B.  et 
al. 2007). These facts underline the dynamically increasing import dependency 
of the EU-27 (52.3%), which is in the case of coal 39.6%, 82.2% of crude oil and 
Fig. 2. Gas reserves in Europe (January 1, 2009, billion m³)
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57.7% of natural gas (2005) (Table 3). This external dependency of the EU is ex-
pected to reach by 2030 66% (coal), 90% (oil) and 80% (gas) (Geopolitics… 2007). 
The dependency of import of hydrocarbons is especially high in the Visegrád 
Group. Due to their historic (COMECON3) past and geographic location their 
oil and gas import is almost exclusively controlled by the Russian Federation. 
The fi rst international oil and gas pipelines supplying the V4 countries with 
Soviet (mostly Russian) fuels were built during the 1960s (Druzhba-Friendship 
oil pipeline 1964, Brotherhood gas pipeline 1967) (Fig. 5).
During the Socialist-Soviet period the oil and gas supply was stable and 
based on long term agreements, also with Western Europe (since 1968!) in spite 
of political disagreements. Following the collapse of the communist alliance sys-
³ COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) was an economic organization of 
the socialist states led (and controlled) by the USSR, between 1949 and 1991.
Fig. 3. Crude oil production and consumption in Europe (2008)
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tem and of the USSR – in spite of the surviving energy interdependencies – the 
previous stability of international energy supply in the post-Communist coun-
tries gradually came to an end. The deeply changed international situation in 
Fig. 4. Natural gas production and consumption in Europe (2008)
Table 3. Fuel Import Dependency of EU-27 and of the Visegrád Group (2005, 2030 in %)
All fuels Coal Oil Gas
2005 2030 2005 2005 2005
EU-27
Czechia
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
52.3
27.4
62.9
18.0
64.6
64.2
50.3
63.9
44.7
69.6
39.6
-17.4
43.4
-22.6
88.5
82.2
97.4
79.2
96.0
81.9
57.7
97.8
81.1
69.7
97.2
Remark: Negative numbers indicate that the country is a net exporter.
Source: EU Energy in Figures, Pocket Book 2007 (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy), 
Mantzos, L.–Capros, P. 2006.
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the eastern half of Europe (enlargement of the EU, establishment of pro-Western 
and pro-Russian economic organizations4 in the former Soviet space) heavily 
transformed the economic equilibrum of international energy (export-import) 
systems and increased the importance of their geopolitic aspects. During the 
second half of 1990s started the eﬀ orts at diversifi cation of energy supply routes 
and bypassing of transit states with new pipeline construction projects.
The dominant actors of the recent west Eurasian geopolitical games 
on energetics, of the new pipeline projects are the Russian Federation and 
the EU (and the USA). The EU-27 largely depends on Russian gas and oil im-
ports (45.1% and 29.9% in 2005), so does Russia depend on European markets 
(Table 4.). The European oil and gas exports represent about 2/3 of total Russian 
exports (Esnault, B. et al. 2007). Accordingly the main economic goal of Russia 
to remain reliable energy supplier for Europe, to decrease dependence from the 
traditional transit countries (fi rst of all from Ukraine and Belarus) and to pre-
serve its dominant position on EU’s gas and oil markets. The latt er is connected 
with the reviving political ambitions of the Kremlin to use energy supply as 
geopolitical weapon to restore past international political position of Russia.
Pipeline projects to reduce Russian dependence
Since second half of 1990s USA pushed for construction of several pipelines 
(e.g. TCGP: Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline, 1996- or Trans Caspian oil pipe-
⁴ GUAM (Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, 1997) established 
by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaĳ an and Moldova to counterbalance Russian infl uence. A 
common interest in eﬀ orts to resolve “frozen confl icts” in their territory (Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaĳ an, Transnistria in Moldova) also 
unite these GUAM countries located in the buﬀ er zone between Russia, the EU and NATO 
and blaming problems for the presence of Russian military forces. EURASEC (Eurasian 
Economic Community) proclaimed on October 10, 2000 by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan (and with the accession of Uzbekistan in 2006) was the union of customs and 
tariﬀ s within CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). 
Table 4. Origin of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Import of EU-27 (2005, in %)
Crude Oil Natural Gas
Russian Federation
Africa
Norway
Middle East
Caspian
Other regions
Total
29.9
18.1
15.5
20.1
6.8
9.6
100.0
45.1
28.3
24.1
2.5
0.0
0.0
100.0
Source: htt p://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy
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line) that would carry Caspian energy westward without transiting Russia. It 
would break Russia’s monopoly on the region’s energy transportation system. 
Moscow moved fast to construct its own Blue Stream submarine gas pipeline 
(2001–2005) from Russia to Turkey, which killed the USA and EU backed TCGP 
project (Geropoulos, K. 2007). At the same time with strong USA support the 
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) project (between Baku and Erzerum) was re-
alised (2006), which allowed Azerbaĳ an and Georgia to resist Russian political 
and economic pressure (Table 5). This gas pipeline with the potential of being 
connected to the Turkmen and Kazakh producers via the planned TCGP would 
be in the future the supplier of the EU backed Nabucco and TGI pipelines. On 
the SCP and the Baku–Supsa, Tbilisi–Yerevan–Tabriz gas pipelines based the 
Ukrainian project of Supsa–Feodosiia submarine pipeline between Georgia 
and Ukraine (bypassing Russia), which could supply Caspian and Iranian gas 
to Ukraine and other European countries. 
The Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) was built during the 
period 2002 and 2006, between the Azerbaĳ ani capital Baku and the Turkish 
Mediterranean port, Ceyhan and represents the second longest oil pipeline of 
the world (1,768 km). The establishment of the pipeline route was geopoliti-
cally and ecologically motivated (bypassing Russia, Iran, the unstable Middle 
East and the overcrowded Turkish straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles) and 
served the increase of the economic independence of the GUAM-member 
Azerbaĳ an from Russia.
For December 2002 a new plan has been worked out regarding the 
extension of the Ukrainian Odesa–Brody oil pipeline (built 2001) to the Polish 
port of Gdańsk. This would be the only route for transporting Caspian oil to 
Central Europe, to the Visegrád countries – bypassing Russia, via the GUAM 
states: Azerbaĳ an, Georgia, Ukraine (through Baku–Batumi–Odesa/Pivdennyi 
terminals). Although it is supported by the EU, this pipeline has only 9 million 
tons annual capacity, which is very modest comparing to larger projects in 
terms of commercial att ractiveness. Moreover, Russia has successfully blocked 
oil transport from Kazakhstan to Ukrainian seaport Odesa. Kazakhstan de-
clined to join this project, unless it is transformed to include Russia and com-
mitt ed additional massive oil volumes for export via Russia. On 10 October 
2007 an agreement to form this pipeline consortium was signed by Poland, 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaĳ an in Vilnius. Finally, in accodance 
with Russia’s will the Kazakh oil (from the giant Tengiz fi led) started to sup-
ply the Odeas-Brody pipeline via the CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) in 
Russia. This project is highly important to make safe oil supply for East Central 
Europe, fi rst of all for Poland and Lithuania. 
On April 3, 2007 Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Italy signed an 
agreement about the construction of a 1,400 km long oil pipeline (South East 
European Line, SEEL) from the Romanian port Constanţa to the Italian Trieste. 
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This EU backed pipe with a planned capacity up to 90 million tons annually 
would reduce tanker transportation in the Turkish straits and Adriatic Sea 
and would be a competitor to the Russian dominated Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
pipeline transporting oil from the Black Sea, Caspian area to the largest mar-
kets of the EU. Most likely source of the oil could be the large Kazakh fi elds, 
from where the main transit routes (CPC) are under Russian control (Socor, 
V. 2006).
Since the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2005), the changed, pro-
Western (EU and NATO) att itudes of Ukrainian foreign policy resulted the in-
crease of Russian natural gas and crude oil prices up to the international level. 
In January 2006 a real gas confl ict was burst out between the two countries be-
cause following the unsuccessful talks about gas prices the Ukrainian Naft ohaz 
company siphoned the main transit gas pipelines running via Ukraine from 
Russia to Central and Western Europe, which resulted the Russian shutdown 
of gas supply. This was not a unique phenomenon, Russia oft en shut down 
pipelines supplies during the time of political disputes (e.g. 2003 Latvia; 2006 
Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, 2007 Azerbaĳ an), which enabled by the extremely 
close relationship between the Russian energy industry and the Kremlin.
Following the gas crisis the EU expressly endeavours to decrease stra-
tegic dependence (EU-25 43% in 2005) on Russian (Gazprom’s) gas and to 
diversify energy supply (Hafner, M. 2006). The fi rst step of this was to real-
ize alternative, non-Russian controlled gas corridors to EU: the Nabucco and 
Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI), for further diversifi cation of export possibilities to 
the European markets, with bypassing Russia and Ukraine. Construction of 
the 3,300 km long Nabucco gas pipeline is expected to begin in 2009 and is 
planned to be fi nished in 2012. It would connect Baumgarten an der March, the 
largest natural gas hub in Austria with Erzerum in Turkey, the end of South 
Caucasus Pipeline. Once completed, it would allow transportation of natural 
gas from producers in the Caspian region such as Azerbaĳ an, Turkmenistan 
and Iran to EU and to the countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary) 
along its path. The recently announced TGI pipe would transfer Caspian gas 
from Turkey through Greece to Italy with an annual capacity of 11.5 bcm and 
completition date of 2012. Though it was an original Austrian conception to 
carry Iranian gas to Europe, the Nabucco project was delayed for years by USA 
opposition to development of Iran’s gas fi elds. Western failure to engage with 
Turkmenistan deprived Nabucco of that possible source of gas for Europe. 
Washington had to insist that Azerbaĳ ani gas alone (expected to fl ow in com-
ing years to eastern Turkey) could support both Nabucco and the planned TGI 
pipeline simultaneously, an argument that led to more questions. Turkey’s 
government, driven by short-term tactical and political considerations (oft en 
unrelated to energy policy as such), never came fully on board the Nabucco 
project. As a result of existing and planned „pro-Russian” and „pro-Western” 
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energetic corridors Turkey became a natural hub for Caspian and Iranian 
gas destined for Europe and the arena of rivalry between EU/US and Russia. 
This strategic transit country similarly to Ukraine is increasingly depends on 
Russian energetic  supplies (60% of natural gas and 20% of oil imports). Due to 
the Russian infl uence, Turkey has already demonstrated cool att itude towards 
Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO aspiration and openly opposed NATO’s naval 
deployments in Black Sea area (Tsereteli, M. 2005).
Pipeline projects to secure Russia’s market positions
Between 1994–1999 was built the 4,196 km long Yamal-Europe pipeline (since 
2005 with a capacity of 33 bcm) to supply Russian gas from the Yamal penin-
sula the North Central European market via Belarus, Poland and Germany. 
The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) transports Russian oil from the Timan 
– Pechora area, West Siberia and the Volga-Ural region to the oil terminal 
Primorsk at the Golf of Finland. The pipe built between 1997–2001 aims to 
bypass the continental transit countries (e.g. Belarus, Ukraine, V4) and supply 
the Western Europe by tankers via the Baltic Sea.
With similar Russian geopolitical motivations was planned (from 1997) 
and started to construct (from 2005) the Nord Stream (former names: North 
Transgas, North European Gas Pipeline) with a 1,196 km long Baltic Sea oﬀ -
shore section between the Russian Vyborg and the German Greifswald. The 
Nord Stream submarine pipeline as an alternative route of the Russian gas 
to West-Central Europe beside of the existing Yamal-Europe pipe have seen 
by opponents as geopolitical weapon against the continental energy transit 
countries (Belarus, Ukraine and V4). The Nord Stream seems to be a tool to 
exert Russian political infl uence on transit countries by threatening their gas 
supply without aﬀ ecting gas exports to Western Europe (Baran, Z. 2007). 
The disagreement over oil tariﬀ s between Belarus and Russia at the 
beginning of January 2007 led to a disruption of oil supplies via Druzhba pipe-
line to Central Europe between January 8 and 11, 2007. Following this event 
the Russian government decided to construct an oil pipeline (Baltic Pipeline 
System-2, BPS-2) from the Druzhba pipe (from Unecha near the Belarus bor-
der) to the Baltic Sea port Primorsk, which annual throughout capacity is 
expected to increase up to 150 million tons.  The BPS-2 reducing Russia’s reli-
ance from the transit state Belarus will redirect about half of the capacity of the 
Druzhba, the oldest and largest oil pipeline transporting Russian and Kazakh 
oil across Europe. This project will cause Belarus a possible loss of revenue of 
3–400 million Euro annually (Resnicoff, M. 2007). 
The Northern Early Oil (NEO) pipeline transports oil from the large 
Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) fi elds in the Caspian Sea near Baku via Grozny 
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to the Russian port Novorossiysk since 1997 and folowing a break since 2005. 
With the launch of the EU-US backed BTC oil pipeline in 2005–2006 the utiliza-
tion of NEO’s capacity is reduced considerably (Zaslavsky, I. 2006).
It was a strategic mistake for the West and a big success for Russia, 
that the 1,510 km long Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) oil pipeline, 
planned to export annually 65 million tons of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia 
(Tengiz – Novorossiysk), was built also by American companies (e.g. Chevron) 
with government approval from the late 1990s to 2001. Currently operating at 
some 28.2 million tons of oil annually, this Russian controlled pipeline direct 
the majority of Kazakhstan’s growing oil output and export to Russia, which 
fact ruined the Western-backed Trans Caspian oil pipeline project (Aqtau 
– Baku) and seriously damage the interests of the US government-backed 
BTC pipeline. 
On May 25, 2007 Russia, Bulgaria and Greece signed a basic treaty to 
implement of the project Burgas – Alexandroupolis oil (previous name: Trans-
Balkan Oil, TBO) pipeline during the period of 2008–2011. This 279 km long 
pipe is the fi rst on the territory of EU to be 51% owned by Russian fi rms and 
aims to supply the western markets with Russian-Kazakh oil bypassing the 
overcrowded Turkish straits.
The Russian geopolitical goals of the construction of the 1,213 km long 
trans-Black Sea gas pipeline, Blue Stream (2005) was to block the plans (TCGP 
and Nabucco) of the EU to use the territory of Turkey to bring gas from the 
Caspian and the Middle East to Europe bypassing Russia. The absence of a real 
Western energy strategy in Western-Central Asian region was demonstrated by 
the ENI, Italy’s state-controlled energy holding company, which was partner of 
the Russian Gazprom at the building of the Blue Stream, loaning the technol-
ogy and fi nancing for the submarine pipeline (Socor, V. 2007). 
Russia evidently again trying to preempt Nabucco and TGI pipeleines 
to preserve its European market dominance. Following the Western opposi-
tion to Gazprom’s involvement in Nabucco, Russia announced in June 2007 
the Russian-Italian project South Stream (900 km long submarine pipeline 
from Russian Novorossiysk to Bulgarian Varna) bypassing both the Caucasian 
countries and Ukraine. From Varna the southwestern route of the South Stream 
would run through Greece to South Italy, the northwestern route would con-
tinue via Romania, Hungary and Slovenia to North Italy.
Beside of this Russia in the frame of its anti-Nabucco campaign in May-
June 2007 signed agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
(with the main gas supplier of the planned Nabucco) to construct new Russia-
bound gas export pipelines, which seriously damage the EU-plans about non-
Russian controlled pipelines from the Caspian region. According to these 
plans vital for the Gazprom and Russia among others a gas pipeline would 
establish from the Russian Aleksandrov Gai (crossing of Soyuz and Central 
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Asia Center Pipelines) to Ukrainian Novopskov, in the same corridor, which is 
used for the Soyuz (1983) gas pipeline. With an annual 28 bcm capacity, this gas 
pipeline could serve as a link in the system through which gas is transported 
from Central Asia to Europe. The pipeline expansion between Uzhhorod and 
Novopskov would strengthen the role of Ukraine as transit country for natural 
gas to Central and Western Europe.
Due to these agreements Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
almost completely depended on Russian-controlled export pipelines. This 
situation made possible for the Russian Gazprom to purchase gas at a rate 
of about 45–65 USD/1,000 cubic metres (Dec., 2006) from these Central Asian 
countries and sell that gas to Western Europe for around 230 USD (Baran, Z. 
2007). To keep out Turkmenistan from the West (and to retain as a reliable gas 
supplier) Gazprom agreed to rise the price of Turkmen gas from 100 USD/1,000 
cubic metres in December 2007 to 130–150 USD in 2008, which could result 
the increase in gas prices also in Ukraine and in V4.
In 2007 Russia’s strategy for Caspian energy resources and transport 
routes was almost completely successful. The main goals of this strategy 
were the following: encircling the EU by gas pipelines (Nord Stream, South 
Stream) bypassing problematic transit countries; buying the majority of the 
East Caspian gas as cheap as possibly and selling as expensively as possible; 
bringing Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas to the West through Russian controlled 
pipes; making Russia’s ties with the Caspian as strong as possible; discourag-
ing or killing competing EU/US backed projects (e.g. TCGP, Nabucco, TGI) and 
ensuring the West that Russia is reliable energy supplier (Karbuz, S. 2007).
Recent developments
The Nabucco Project
For the spring of 2009 new challenges has been emerged for supporters of 
Nabucco projects to cope with. According to original plans the pipeline is 
scheduled to start operating in 2013, but it is doubtful that it will be built. 
Continued and current hesitation by the private sector to fi nance this project, 
not to mention the brief war between Russia and Georgia for South Ossetia in 
August 2008, means that Nabucco has to face an uncertain future.
It’s also a real problem, that Nabucco faces many further obstacles, 
among which are the planned rival South Stream pipeline, supported by 
Russia's giant company Gazprom. The European Commission insists that 
Nabucco is not an att empt to fi nd alternatives to Russian supplies, but a neces-
sary additional channel. This position is confi rmed heavily by ÖMV Austrian 
gas and oil company, interested in the project.
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The gas crisis burst out between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 
and cut or disrupted gas supplies to 18 EU member countries did not appear 
to be a suﬃ  cient argument in favour of Nabucco among experts of European 
Parliament's foreign aﬀ airs committ ee. At political level, at fi rst it had ap-
peared that Nabucco would gain credibility in light of the crisis.
In mid January 2009 the member states of the European Parliament 
have issued a rather pessimistic draft  report on EU energy security, in which 
Nabucco featured prominently. This important report was presented just a 
few days before Hungary organizes a 'Nabucco summit' in Budapest at the 
end of that month. 
The summit had raised hopes that the project could be re-launched 
soonest. Representatives of the Czech Republic, which country holds a half 
year rotating EU presidency, have indicated they will push for Nabucco project 
as one of its top priorities.
Idependent experts of the Centre for European Policy Studies empha-
size that the main question is: Where the Nabucco-gas come from? Lack of 
large technical investment makes imports from Iran problematic. It is because 
that country is still a net importer of gas, despite holding the world's second-
largest natural gas reserves. Besides, serious political and economic sanctions 
against Iran make the whole Nabucco project appear more likely to be realised 
only in the distant future. 
As for Turkmenistan the country's government is reluctant to deliver 
gas to Europe, as it prefers to sell to Russia on high prices and Turmenistan 
also has China as an alternative client. 
Regarding the issue of transit Turkey can be considered as a key transit 
country. It has huge domestic demand for Russian or othe natural gas itself, 
while legal disputes on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea could be used by 
Russia to block the project. Additional problem is the fi nancing of Nabucco 
which remained a challenge. 
Problems regarding to the Nabucco project has emerged in the focus of 
more NATO experts. They also express their scepticism towards the project. By 
their latest opinion it remains unclear which sources and routes would be more 
benefi cial and reliable. The warned, if the main goal of the European Union is 
to enhance routes that are not controlled by Moscow, there is a real risk that 
the EU will compete in markets in which it is not familiar or well-placed. 
The South and North Stream projects
The plan to build the South Stream, a new gas pipeline under the Black Sea 
linking the Russian Black Sea port Novorossiysk to Bulgaria's Varna would 
mean that Russia would no longer send its gas supplies through Ukraine, 
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which locked horns with Russia over payment of outstanding gas debts last 
December. The dispute led to gas supply disruptions to European consumers 
in winter. It will contribute the diversifi cation of gas supplies, which is an 
important factor in energy security. 
Putt ing into operation South Stream will meet these requirements. 
Gazprom’s representatives more times promised to develop of the Arctic gas 
fi eld, which has estimated reserves of 133 trillion cubic feet. That would sup-
ply the North Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, currently being 
built under the Baltic Sea.
Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy and many other EU-members have 
also reiterated their interest in construction of the South Stream gas pipeline, 
intended to send Russian gas to Europe across the Black Sea bed. The South 
Stream gas pipeline, is due to be commissioned in 2013.
Meanwhile Belarus has proposed another pipeline to guarantee a sta-
ble supply of Russian natural gas to Europe, and has sought involvement of 
Poland and Germany in the project. The proposed pipeline would bring gas 
from the Yamal Peninsula in NW Siberia. But some Ukrainian experts are cau-
tioning against such expansion. The emphasize, it is necessary to guarantee not 
just the route but the supplier. Presently, several European countries depend 
solely on the Russian monopoly Gazprom, and construction of more pipelines 
from Russia would only reinforce dependency on Russian gas.
Additionally, the major part of the North Stream pipeline is designed 
to be laid almost entirely along the sea bott om that runs through the economic 
zones of Baltic countries. This plan creates additional tension over national se-
curity concerns, land ownership and environmental issues. A purely economic 
issue here is ownership of the gas and the transmission pipelines. 
Ukraininan economists suggest separating the object of gas transporta-
tion and the pipelines to avoid vertical integration and monopolization of the 
market. It would be necessary because both ‘Stream’ projects are not reliable 
means to diversify gas transit through Ukraine and to ensure constant gas 
supplies to East and West European countries as consumers.
Finally, Hungary has made a contract with Russia in March 2009 to 
contribute to the construction costs of Hungarian section of South Stream (in 
a rate of 15%) which oﬀ ers an alternative solution in gas supply instead of the 
traditional route running via Ukraine. 
Further alternative solution to Hungary for a safe gas supply
Hungary is one of the most energy-sensitive country among East Central 
European states. It was suﬀ ering from the negative eﬀ ects of gas crisis during 
January 2009 and now is searching for alternative solutions to safe enough 
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quantity of natural gas for their consumers inside of the country. It seems to 
be a strategic question because of the high rate of natural gas consumption 
for electric energy production. Between 1990 and 2007 it’s share has increased 
from 19.7% to 37,9% in Hungary (Reményi, 2009).
Desiring to perevent the crisis situation in the future Hungary and 
Croatia plan to build a brand new gas transit pipeline by mid-2011 which 
would ship gas from Hungary to Croatia, but would also allow two-way ship-
ments later. This plan has been announced by the representatives of MOL's gas 
transmission ‘Földgázszállító’ (FGSZ = Natural Gas Transporter), the leading 
gas supplier in Hungary in February 2009.
The new pipeline would have an annual capacity of around 6.5 bil-
lion cbms. The heads of Plinacro, the gas branch of Croatian INA, and the 
Hungarian company FGSZ” decided to sign a joint development agreement 
soon aimed at connecting the pipeline networks of Hungary and Croatia.
The new pipeline will be reversible, which means once a planned liquefi ed 
natural gas (LNG) terminal which is built on the island of Krk in Croatia’s north-
ern Adriatic. This also means that this small independent country in SE-Europe 
will be able to connect to any of the major international pipelines that may be 
built in the future, like Nabucco or South Stream. By the content of the cintract 
Földgázszállító will build the 206-km long Hungarian section of the pipeline, 
while Croatia will cover the costs of the 88 km stretch in Croatia. The pipeline will 
connect the village of Városföld in Hungary with Slobodnica in Croatia.
The Balkans were severely aﬀ ected by stopping in gas supplies arising 
from Moscow’s dispute with Ukraine this January and Croatia considered the 
planned LNG terminal as crucial for diversifying energy supplies.
Hungary, which also heavily relies on Russian gas imports but has suf-
fi cient reserves and has also domestic natural gas production on the territory of 
Hungarian Alföld (Great Plain) shipped gas to Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia during 
the gas crisis in January. The large capacity LNG terminal planned by a consor-
tium of Croatian and European energy fi rms, should also improve supply security 
for the wider region as it will be able to process more gas than Croatia needs. 
Conclusions
The global increase of hydrocarbon energy demand resulted the sustained in-
crease in energy prices since 1999 and pushed the energy (especially the gas 
supply) security as a dominant global geopolitical issue. There is an energy 
interdependency between the suppliers and consumers, which underline the 
need of security of supply and of markets. Although the fair relations between 
the exporters, importers and the transit countries should be the priority of en-
ergy issues, due to the increasing competition for energy resources and markets, 
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beside of economic factors also the geopolitical motivations could be observed 
at decision making. As a result of litt le unity among EU-member states’ energy 
policies Russia oft en took advantage of this situation. Due to this lack of unity 
the Kremlin could “preemptively block European att empts to construct trans-
port routes for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas that do not involve Rus-
sia” (Baran, Z. 2007). The countries, and the large European energy companies 
(e.g. ENI, BASF, Ruhrgas, Gaz de France, Gasunie) are played against each other 
by Moscow in order to secure more favourable (oft en dominant) market situa-
tion for Russia. Sometimes Russia seems to strive aft er driving wedge between 
the eastern (former Soviet ally) and western member states of the EU.
The energy strategy of East Central European countries have joined to 
EU in 2004, it can be stated that majority of these countries have already energy 
policy and strategy to secure their own energy supply. All of them are making 
fl uent eﬀ orts to be independent from considerable part of the Russian oil and 
gas import in the near or farer future. To avoid negative eﬀ ects of the future’s 
unforeseen gas wars and unfriendly actions originated from Russia or Ukraine, 
the new member states of the European Union have worked out more scenarios 
and projects for the future. Additionally, they have also declared targets to 
increase the rate of renewable energy in their domestic energy production.
Opposite to it Hungary is still stuck into powerful energy econo-
mies that drive to international energy-security politics. The county has just 
switched sides when turned oﬀ  from US initiations and gave preference to 
Russian connections. Furthermore there are no visible indication of a coherent 
national energy security strategy. It is not surprising that the country is not 
taken into account when decisions are made, neither to the extent is should. It 
shoud be priority to take pending political decisions and  form a real national 
strategy.
Hungary’s EU lobbying techniques should also be enhanced. However, 
without clear political intentions and decisions it is diﬃ  cult to lobby for any-
thing. Technically and fi nancially the country is not prepared to provide a sub-
stantial portion of national energy production from renewable energy sources. 
It is very unlikely that long term objectives will be integrated into eﬀ ective 
government actions. The European Union is also putt ing the requirement of 
sound economic management over savings energy and all these initiatives 
Hungary have to take into consideration. 
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development. The content of the present volume was based on fi ndings of an EU Interreg 
III B CADSES (2005-2008) project, titled: ‘GreenKeys – Urban Green as a Key for Sustainable 
Cities’. The project had three main objectives. Firstly, to plan and implement pilot projects 
in the partner cities and collect the experience gained during the whole process. Secondly, 
to formulate an Urban Green Space Strategy, which can be used as a template in future 
projects. Finally, to help transfer the knowledge and know-how in the topic, and to publish 
the results. The GreenKeys brought together 12 cities from 7 countries, 8 scientifi c support-
ers (among them the research group of the Geographical Research Institute Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Budapest), external experts, design studios and NGOs. Besides, the 
public participation and involvement of local stakeholders were a crucial goal of (and at the 
same time tool for) the project. It is worth to mention that the GreenKeys project has partly 
been built upon the EU FP5 project, called URGE (Development of Urban Greenspaces to 
Improve the Quality of Life in Cities and Urban Regions) as an antecedent. 
The fact that the present book was writt en by authors who participated actively in 
the whole procedure of the given pilot project could guarantee what one can claim from a 
guide: to provide swift , defi nite and universally usable methods for solving the problems 
and to give answers to the emerging questions. The structure of the volume (made up of 
fi ve major chapters) certainly meets this requirement. 
In the Introduction the authors proclaim their credo: the urban green space develop-
ment contributes to the sustainability of cities in all detail. The benefi ts are observable in the 
economic, social, ecological and environmental spheres of life. Four major phenomena make 
this issue timely: the numerous ‘brownfi elds’ within urban areas having appeared aft er eco-
nomic restructuring and deindustrialization, the climate change which aﬀ ects the built-up city 
areas profoundly, the increasing need of bett er quality of life and the aspect of public health. 
The second, most lengthy part makes the readers acquainted with strategy plan-
ning procedure step-by-step. Three main phases can be defi ned: the starting part, in which 
the aims, priorities, and the exact implementation steps have to be identifi ed aft er establish-
ing the strategy group. Collecting and analyzing data and subjective information are the 
primary purpose in the second, analytical part. The third, action part deals with the devel-
opment of urban green space strategy and ends with the preparation of its draft  version. 
It also oﬀ ers an implementation plan in accordance with the needs that have already been 
revealed. Here we can fi nd a subsection (Pool for strategies) which gives exact examples not 
only from the experiences of the project partners, but from the UK (Bristol, Doncaster) and 
Germany (Münster) as well, about how to deal with the emerging issues and to surmount 
possible obstacles. It also oﬀ ers diﬀ erent types of solution in such cases. 
One of the most diﬃ  cult questions of the action part of every project is how to 
raise funds. The example of Nova Gorica, Slovenia was mentioned where the HIT Group (a 
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casino and tourist corporation) co-fi nanced the development of the green space. The story of 
the involvement of a private company began with an event organized by a local artist. The 
artist sold hand-made plastic fl owers to collect money to build a children’s playground in 
the city park. Naturally, the amount collected this way was not suﬃ  cient but publicity was 
aroused among politicians and other decision makers. All this contributed to the decision 
of the management of the casino, situated near to the projected playground, and run by 
the HIT group, to co-fi nance the project. 
The third part of the book is an att empt to present an overview of the experience 
gained from the implementation of the GreenKeys pilot projects. As a general rule we can 
state that the faults committ ed in the starting and analytical part of the strategy can easily 
hamper implementation or raise diﬃ  culties. 
The fourth chapter provides an overview of the tools developed during the project. 
This section practically functions as a manual for the contents accessible in the website 
(htt p://www.greenkeys-project.net) and on the enclosed CD-ROM, which is a good idea 
indeed as the documents, questionnaires, tables with the instruments, techniques, concepts 
are completely downloadable and applicable in the work of experts and interested and 
committ ed civil stakeholders. 
In the last chapter recommendations concerning the green policies of cities are 
formulated and the local authorities, national governments and the European Commission 
are called for action. This chapter describes the multilevel benefi ts (for individuals, local 
communities, tourists) of green space development in diﬀ erent (social, environmental, 
economic) aspects. The importance of the initiative and supportive roles of the local govern-
ment is emphasized, and the special relevance of cooperation between the related actors 
i.e. the local authorities, professional consultants, scientifi c advisors and the inhabitants, 
local stakeholders is pointed out. The involvement of the inhabitants (primary users of the 
green area) into the procedure from the planning phase till the implementation and main-
tenance means to contribute to the local civic awareness in positive sense and to motivate 
the population to care for the new or renovated green area. Next to the involvement of the 
local stakeholders and public participation it is the interdisciplinary approach and the  co-
operation between the scientifi c and administrative experts that are the key elements for 
the successful planning and realization of an Urban Green Strategy. 
In most cases the logical structure of the booklet is accompanied with an att ractive 
appearance. The framed texts refer to examples from the practice of the project partners 
but in other cases they stand for important statements, recommendations. Maybe it would 
have been more logic to diﬀ erentiate between the two. Another problem with these green-
framed writings is that they sometimes hamper the understanding of the subsection as 
they are cut in the main text. Beside these, an abundance of maps, fi gures and diagrams 
help the bett er interpretation of the message. Photos made the book colourful and ’easy-to-
read’ – notwithstanding some of them seem to be unnecessary and redundant. The green 
CD-ROM-symbol always reminds the reader to check further information on the att ached 
CD-ROM, while the green arrow indicates cross-reference to other chapters of the book.
The experience and problem oriented approach of the guide might encourage and 
could inspire launching further similar projects. Additional strong point is that beside the 
enumeration of benefi ts emerging from the green space renewing projects it also indicates 
the diﬃ  culties and dysfunctions.
The guide can suggest good ideas to the professionals, and also may be used 
by the interested civilians who care for maintaining and improving of their residential 
environment.
Ágnes Erőss 
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Kocsis, K., Rudenko, L. and Schweitzer, F. (eds.): Ukraine in Maps. Institute of Geography 
National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Geographical Research Institute Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. Kyiv–Budapest, 2008. 147 p.
The second volume of a series prepared in the Geographical Research Institute 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (GRI HAS) focuses on an East European state, Ukraine. 
The fi rst member of the series presented South Eastern Europe (2005, 2007) whereas the 
third book will introduce Hungary as it were to give the public a foretaste of a new edi-
tion of the national atlas of the country. This series of publication is aimed at presenting a 
comprehensive overview of regions and countries in English richly illustrated by maps. The 
volumes might have an importance for geographers, be informative for experts in foreign 
aﬀ airs and politicians, and they are also to serve business, especially fi rms with intentions 
to invest in the regions and countries in concern. 
The launch of the series (and the fact that already the third volume is in prepa-
ration) is clear evidence that research of the foreign countries and territories have a fi rm 
place in academic institutions including the GRI HAS. Studies on areas beyond the national 
boundaries is going to have an increasing strategic importance making classic regional 
geography face new challenges at the same time promoting its revival. 
Ukraine in Maps is a publication accomplished by adaptation of the aspects of clas-
sic geographical description to the contemporary conditions in Ukraine and purposed for 
general orientation. It means that it is not the new achievements of the scientifi c research 
that have been placed in the focus, instead the volume oﬀ ers essential knowledge for the 
broad audience in the form of an atlas: maps with textual comments. A high level outward 
appearance is at par with similar publications in the west and might have a place on the 
bookshelf along with standard atlases. 
The volume is a product of cooperation between two workshops in geography: 
Institute of Geography of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and GRI HAS. 
Beside the publication of the book this collaboration has made a substantial contribution 
to the development of links and deepened scientifi c relations in geography. Preparations, 
editing and fi nalization required exchange of experts i.e. study trips to Kiev and Budapest. 
In the wake of Ukraine in Maps new publications came into being and cooperations were 
initiated so joint activities have proven to be a good start.  
The actuality and novelty of the pictorial textbook is that it is a pioneer edition, 
since no similar publication was hitherto issued on Ukraine either in Hungary or abroad. 
Certainly there was a previous att empt (e.g. Ukraine. Industry and investment activity) 
but beside map inscriptions it contained only very short explanations in English. A new 
National Atlas of Ukraine (NAU, 2008) is a rather prestigious volume but only map titles 
appear in that language. Another specifi c feature of the joint Hungarian-Ukrainian album 
is its approach stemming from confers of Hungarian geographers with the Ukrainian col-
leagues, consequently it contains both external and internal refl ections. 
The work is subdivided into three parts and further into eleven chapters. A short 
historical overview is followed by the analyses of natural environment and social condi-
tions; they form the background behind the state of economy which is in the focus of the 
book. An introduction into the national economy of Ukraine might rely on eager interest 
of the reader; this is why such an emphasis has been put on this topic. 
77 maps and 21 tables are accompanied with the explanatory notes. Part of the 
maps was constructed by Ukrainian geographers but the Hungarian contribution is signifi -
cant as well. The latt er maps as a rule are of illustrative in character, striking and easy to 
survey. They are chiefl y associated with human geographical phenomena, such as ethnic 
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composition, languages, population change, incomes, urbanization and also appear in the 
chapter on agriculture. For some fi gures the spatial patt erns are shown by raion instead of 
the oblast level, which is a pioneer undertaking; similar maps of detailed resolution does 
not even appear in the new NAU. The diﬀ erences between the approaches represented by 
the Ukrainian and Hungarian schools of geography are clearly discernible in the chapter 
on economy which praises the eﬀ orts made overwhelmingly by the Ukrainian party. These 
maps oft en require long analyses and less interpretable at fi rst glance because they reveal 
intricate spatial structures relating to e.g. privatization, gross value added (GVA) or foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Ukrainian human geography is dominated by industrial geography 
still based on the spatial distribution of productive forces, epitomized in a heavily descrip-
tive chapter. Factors putt ing the country in an international context as its transit position 
with a special reference to the pipelines in hydrocarbon transport were mainly presented 
by the Hungarian experts.
The introductory chapter is aimed at positioning Ukraine in Europe. Beyond the 
classic aspects such as geographical sett ing, territorial extension, borders, administrative 
divisions, an assessment of the economy is presented in European context with an emphasis 
on aspirations of the country to the integration in the EU. Participation of Ukraine in TACIS 
programme is also referred to. 
A short outline of the country’s historical evolution also allows a brief insight in 
ethnogenesis of the Ukrainians. It is supported by a spectacular map series depicting the 
change in statehood on the territory what is now Ukraine during the past more than one 
thousand years, initially in Kievan Rus, then within the Polish-Lithuanian Union, later in the 
Ott oman Empire then under the Russian czarism and more recently in the Soviet Union. 
Natural conditions are addressed to a relatively minor extent in the album. 
Nevertheless aft er tackling topography and geological structure it is the soils, followed by 
solid mineral fuels (coal, peat) and metal ores (iron, manganese, chrome, nickel) of utmost 
economic signifi cance that are introduced in detail. There is an extensive description of 
climatic conditions which have a key importance for the country with high agroecological 
potential. Following landscape types and physical-geographical divisions the ecological 
situation comes to the fore. A general assessment made by the Ukrainian geographers is 
accompanied by a map of air pollution and by another one of the Chernobyl aft ermath.
Social conditions start to be displayed with population: ethnicities, languages and 
religions. Along with the actual patt erns this chapter presents an analysis of changes during 
the 20th century and shows (eastern and western) diasporas of the Ukrainians. Chapter on 
the demographic features along with population patt erns and change also include level 
of education, economic activity and unemployment. These characteristics are shown on 
raion level as well. The chapter on the sett lement system focuses on the urban network; 
rural Ukraine (in spite of its high relevance) has a regrett ably subordinate part to play in 
this account. Beyond the historical development size categories and urban functions are 
described. Urban population is outlined on raion level too. 
The most extensive chapter deals with the national economy. Apart from the 
general characteristics (privatization, GVA, investment including FDI) if focuses on the 
power industry and infrastructure as a strategic sector. Most of the pipelines transporting 
liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons cross Ukraine and the country also is a zone of encounter 
between the European and Russian electric power systems. Further the chapter describes 
machinery engineering, chemicals and food industries with long traditions but nowadays 
suﬀ ering from a sharp decline. Farming has a particular importance and summarized in a 
special chapter. Agricultural production, structures and ownership patt erns are presented 
along with crop cultivation and livestock breeding.
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There are three chapters left  to depict transport and telecommunications, R&D, 
recreational potential and tourism turnover. Beside the characteristics of transport per-
formance and traﬃ  c volume (public roads, railways, pipelines, waterways) a separate map 
shows international transport corridors. Wired and wireless systems of telecommunication, 
cellular network and mobile phone services are described. The chapter on tourism lists 
places worth to visit by categories such as natural att ractions (forests, watersides, moun-
tains, mineral springs including medicinal waters) and cultural heritage (e.g. monasteries, 
UNESCO World Heritage sites). Tourism infrastructure and the international tourist fl ow 
are also presented within this increasingly important sector of economy.
The volume is a worthwhile undertaking to complete the literature on the geog-
raphy of Ukraine available in English. Its comprehensive and versatile approach brings 
the reader closer to the understanding internal structures and conditions of Ukraine. The 
album can be recommended for study in general orientation and in a starting phase of any 
research. 
Dávid Karácsonyi
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In memoriam András Rónai
On  November 21, 2006 Geographical Research Institute of Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
(GRI HAS) held a birth centenary conference in honour of András Rónai (1906–1991), 
the geographer and geologist of wide renown. Aft er the opening speech of academician 
Sándor Marosi (GRI HAS), professor Zoltán Dövényi, deputy director of GRI HAS made 
a broad outline on Rónai’s life-work and on the historical circumstances of his activities. 
He drew att ention on the dramatic events in Hungary during the 20th century which had 
had an adverse eﬀ ect on the scientifi c public life. Following World War II hitherto fl ourish-
ing academic disciplines disappeared or sank into negligence having not fi tt ed into the 
new oﬃ  cial political orientation. These changes also aﬀ ected the career of scholars who 
conducted such studies and there had been only few among them to carry on through 
giving up original fi eld of interest and taking up a politically neutral stance. Such a repre-
sentative of geosciences was András Rónai, who cultivated human geography (primarily 
political and ethnic geography) until the end of the 1940s, then switched to geology and 
had become an expert of world renown in hydrogeology and Quaternary studies.
Professor Zoltán Hajdú (Research Centre for Regional Studies HAS, Pécs) spoke 
about Rónai’s contribution to political geography which could be characterised by an overall 
fair and unbiased approach to the issues that had to be solved, through the analyses of high 
accuracy, orderly and scholarly level. He had always accepted this principle as valid, even in 
the course of handling statistical data produced in successor states of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. Rónai wanted to get a clear insight in autorepresentation of these states and 
formed his analysing and correcting criticism on the basis of fairly elaborated data sets. Rónai 
had come from below socially, i.e. he did not belong to the ominous middle classes, which 
did not stand unprecedented in Hungarian geography of the period between the world wars. 
He became university professor thanks to his gift , diligence, stubborn and persevering work; 
his advancement along the social ladder was purely due to his merits. He engaged himself 
to service in sharp historical and political situations and represented scholarly approach in 
an age when it was not advantageous in many cases, because propaganda seemed to yield 
more spectacular results than making use of well-founded arguments. 
Professor Károly Kocsis (GRI HAS) emphasized, that in the fi rst third of Rónai’s 
academic career he acted as political geographer. Though he never considered himself an 
ethnic geographer, from the viewpoint of the discipline in the present-day sense, i.e. re-
search of spatial aspects of ethnic issues and their mapping, his scientifi c activity prior to 
1949 is to be considered a milestone in the development of Hungarian ethnic geography of 
the 20th century. His studies on political and economic geography of Central Europe and 
the Carpathian Basin and their regions were subordinated to the eﬀ orts in territorial revi-
sion of Trianon Peace Treaty by Hungary. These demands were also supported by ethnic 
geographical investigations. Apart from the multi-ethnic composition of population of the 
whole area in general and of Transylvania as his homeland in particular, this approach 
stemmed from impressions of childhood and youth spent there, his ethnic tolerance, com-
mand of languages and last but not least from the moral and scholarly infl uence of his 
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patron and mentor, Count Pál Teleki. Rónai’s research activities of nearly two decades in 
ethnic geography can be subdivided into four phases on the basis of national and personal 
cataclysms (1938, 1941, 1945) presented by his main publications.
Academician István Klinghammer (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest) gave a 
detailed information about the Atlas of Central Europe, Rónai’s masterpiece in cartography. 
From December 1940 until May 1945 Rónai acted as director of the Institute of Political 
Sciences at Budapest. According to the verbal testament of Count Pál Teleki immediately 
prior to his suicide (he probably anticipated an eventual defeat of the Axis Powers) Rónai 
launched a project to publish an Atlas of Central Europe containing a series of predominantly 
thematic maps which was compiled from more than 3.5 million statistical data published by 
ten states of the region in the 1930s and 40s (environment, population, economy, transport 
etc.). The atlas represents an area from Saxony to Lemberg (west to east), to the Abruzzi and 
Foggia in Italy, Albania, Skopje and Edirne (down south). This volume of 171 maps with 
an extensive explanatory notes (altogether 367 pages) had been edited and drawn at the 
Institute, which was relocated to Balatonfüred at the end of the war. A limited number of rot-
aprint copies (quasi-proofs) were produced by March 15, 1945. The Soviet troops took the set-
tlement ten days aft er. From the material a digital facsimile was produced at the Department 
of Cartography of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest and the Atlas was printed out anew 
in 1993. It provides an image of Central Europe on the eve of World War II.
The last paper was presented by Dr László Kuti (Geological Institute of Hungary, 
Budapest) who spoke about Rónai’s activity in the fi eld of geology. Rónai joined the 
Geological Institute of Hungary in February 1950 as the head of the Department of 
Cartography. He became involved in the newly initiated mapping of the Great Hungarian 
Plain led by J. Sümeghy, organised and managed groundwater mapping of lowland areas 
to the very end. In 1956 he was appointed head of Lowland Department. He initiated the 
mapping of lowland areas at 1:200 000 scale being as a matt er of fact the revision of the 
previous survey. During this campaign he elaborated the methodological bases of low-
land mapping. Upon these principles he started the complex, comprehensive geological 
mapping of the Great Hungarian Plain in 1964. The survey based on a shallow borehole 
grid spaced in a predefi ned network opened a new perspective in lowland mapping on 
international level as well. The work had not only been initiated but it was completed 
brilliantly, though the last map sheets were compiled by his colleagues half a year aft er 
his retirement. Just another result of international interest was the establishment of deep 
subsurface water monitoring network in the Great Hungarian Plain. Drillings set up along 
two profi les and penetrating the whole Quaternary sequence not only contributed to the 
unrivalled monitoring network but they put the Quaternary stratigraphy of Central Europe 
on a completely new basis. The results of his survey of the Great Hungarian Plain during 
several decades were summarised in his last substantial work “The Quaternary Geology 
of the Great Hungarian Plain” (1985).
In the closing part of the three-hour-long memorial conference professor Ferenc 
Schweitzer, director of the GRI HAS summarized the results of the meeting. He empha-
sized that Rónai’s scientifi c heritage must be referred to among the greatest achievements of 
Hungarian geology. Rónai presumed that geological survey would in perspective shift  from 
classical geology, lithology and paleontology towards hydrogeology, engineering geology 
and environmental geology. It was the promotion of the latt er disciplines that he recom-
mended strongly. At last professor Schweitzer added: András Rónai was a real Hungarian 
patriot, who did his best for our homeland and Hungarians in all of his life.
Edit Éva Kiss
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